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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is composed of three essays on banking and corporate finance.
The first essay studies the relationship between interest-rate derivative usage and bank
lending. Using recent data that cover a full business cycle, this paper documents a direct
relationship between interest-rate derivative usage by U.S. banks and growth in their
commercial and industrial (C&I) loan portfolios. This positive association holds for
interest-rate options contracts, forward contracts, and futures contracts. This result is
consistent with the implication of Diamond’s model (1984) that predicts that a bank’s use
of derivatives permits better management of systematic risk exposure, thereby lowering
the cost of delegated monitoring, and generates net benefits of intermediation services.
Using recent data that spans a full business cycle, the second essay examines how
derivative usage affects the interest-rate sensitivity of bank holding companies from 1998
to 2003. The major finding of this study is that stock returns of a bank holding company
using derivatives are less sensitive to interest-rate changes, controlling for balance-sheet
composition and asset size. This economically significant finding suggests that interestrate derivatives allow banks to lessen their systematic exposure to changes in interest
rates and thereby increase their potential to better manage their interest-rate risk
exposure. This result is consistent with Diamond’s (1984) prediction in which a bank can
use interest-rate derivatives to hedge against interest-rate risk.

iii
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Previous research investigates how corporate finance managers make their bondmaturity decisions. The third essay is exploratory, investigating the relationship between
duration and bond characteristics. The relationship between firm features and the
durations of 8,627 corporate debt issues placed by U.S. corporations in public markets
between 1990 and 2002 is examined. The major finding of the study is that firm quality,
as measured by credit rating, is directly related to bond duration. The findings also
suggest that bond duration is inversely related to firm size, that regulated non-fmancial
firms have longer bond duration, and that syndicated offerings have longer duration than
non-syndicated offerings.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is comprised of three essays on banking and corporate finance.
The first two essays are closely related to the banks’ use of derivatives. The choice of
these two topics is motivated by Diamond’s (1984) theory of financial intermediation.
According to Diamond (1984), banks serve as delegated monitors with a comparative
advantage to small depositors in monitoring and enforcing loan-contract provisions.
Diamond shows that portfolio diversification within financial intermediaries is the
financial-engineering technology that allows banks to lower the cost of delegated
monitoring and thereby to generate net benefits of intermediation services. In Diamond’s
model, banks find it optimal to eliminate all diversifiable risks because the resulting
equilibrium enables banks to monitor loan contracts efficiently and avoid costly
liquidation.
An implication of Diamond’s model is that banks should not assume any
nondiversifiable risks unless they have special advantages in managing them. One of the
most important risks that banks face is interest-rate risk. Banks do not have special
advantages in bearing interest-rate risk. Therefore, they use interest-rate derivatives to
hedge against that risk. In theory, the existence of an active derivative market should
increase the potential for banks to move toward their desired levels of interest risk.

1
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2
In one of his speeches (2004), Alan Greenspan, the chairman of the Federal
Reserve Board from August of 1987 to February of 2006, states that complex financial
instruments such as derivatives have contributed to the development of an efficient,
flexible, and resilient financial system. The potential of derivative instruments to reduce
the interest-rate risk exposure of banks has been widely recognized; however, the
tremendous increase in the use of derivatives by banks in the last two decades has
triggered regulators’ concerns as to whether banking firms have used derivatives
primarily for hedging or for speculation. A major concern facing policymakers and bank
regulators today is the possibility that the rising use of derivatives has increased the
riskiness of individual banks and of the banking system as a whole.
The first essay in this study addresses the hedging vis-a-vis speculation question
by examining the relationship between bank lending and derivative usage. There are two
risk components in a bank’s loan portfolio: systematic risk and unsystematic risk.
Diamond demonstrates that interest-rate derivative contracts allow banks to reduce their
exposure to systematic risk in their loan portfolios. This risk reduction allows banks to
take further advantage of diversification. As a result, banks are able to make more loans
without changing the total risk level of the loan portfolio. This position consequently
increases the banks’ abilities to provide more intermediation services. One major
implication of Diamond’s theory of financial intermediation is that derivative contracts
facilitate loan growth.
The relationship between derivative usage and lending activity has been studied in
recent years. Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) evaluate an equation relating the
determinants of Commercial and Industrial (C&I) lending to the impact of derivatives on
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C&I loan lending activity. They document a positive relationship between C&I loan
growth and the use of derivatives over a sample period from 1985 to 1992. They find that
derivative markets allow banks to increase lending activities at a greater rate than they
would have otherwise. Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (2001) examine the major differences
in the financial characteristics of banking organizations that use derivatives when
compared to those that do not. They find that banks that use derivatives grow their
business-loan portfolio faster than banks that do not use derivatives. Pumanandam (2004)
also reports that the derivative users make more C&I loans than non-users.
There are two major research questions that arise in the literature with respect to
derivative usage:

Does derivative usage facilitate loan growth, and if not, is there a

negative association between lending activity and derivative usage? Using recent data
that cover a full business cycle, the first essay in this study revisits these two questions to
ascertain if a significantly positive relationship still exists between bank lending activity
and derivative usage.
The second essay investigates the relationship between banks’ derivative usage
and their interest-rate risk exposure. An implication of the Diamond (1984) model is that
banks should not assume any risks that are not diversifiable unless the banks have special
advantages in monitoring them. Thus, in Diamond’s model, banks find it optimal to
hedge all interest-rate risk either by using a derivative approach or by matching the
maturity of assets and liabilities as closely as possible. The popularity of derivative usage
is due to the fact that derivatives provide a relatively inexpensive means for banks to
change their interest-risk exposure. As stated by Hirtle (1997), the existence of an active
derivative market should increase the potential for banks to move toward their desired
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levels of interest risk. This potential benefit has been widely recognized, and the question
that has arisen is whether or not banks have used derivatives primarily to reduce the risks
arising from their other banking activities (for hedging) or to achieve higher levels of
interest-rate risk exposure (for speculation).
The second essay tests Diamond’s (1984) hypothesis that derivative instruments
allow banks to better manage their interest-rate risk exposure. Specifically, an
examination is made of the role of derivatives in determining the interest-rate sensitivity
of bank holding companies’ (BHC) net worth, while controlling for the influence of onbalance-sheet activities and other bank-specific characteristics.
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have attempted to investigate the
factors that firms consider when choosing the maturity of their debt issues. In the third
essay, the duration of debt issues is examined. As an exploratory investigation, the third
essay searches for potential linkages between the various theories and empirical findings
from the previous literature on debt maturity and bond duration. Some questions about
the determinants of debt maturity may also be answered by examining the firms’ duration
choices. Duration measures the number of years required to recover the true cost of a
bond, considering the present value of all coupon and principal payments received in the
future. Debt maturity focuses more on matching the cash flow generated from the chosen
project to the life of the project. Research on comparing both approaches may discern
whether firms focus on duration or maturity. Hypotheses that have been offered to
explain corporate debt maturity are used to examine the firms’ duration choices to see if
factors that influence maturity choices also affect bond duration. A sample of 8,627 debt
issues from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database is examined to identify the
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important factors in determining the length of duration of public, non-convertible debt.
Macaulay’s Duration is used as the dependent variable to test the theoretical hypotheses
where bond duration is influenced by signaling and asymmetric information as well as
agency problems.
The organizational plan for the dissertation is as follows: Chapter 2 examines the
relationship between interest-rate derivative usage by U.S. banks and growth in their
commercial and industrial loan portfolios. Chapter 3 investigates the role of derivatives in
shaping bank holding companies’ (BHC) interest-rate risk exposure in recent years.
Chapter 4 tests theoretical hypotheses where bond duration is influenced by signaling and
asymmetric information as well as agency problems. Finally, Chapter 5 presents the
conclusions, implications, and recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
BANK LENDING AND INTEREST-RATE
DERIVATIVES
Introduction
The relationship between the use of derivatives and lending activity has been
studied in recent years. Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) evaluate an equation relating
the determinants of Commercial and Industrial (C&I) lending and the impact of
derivatives on C&I loan lending activity. They document a positive relationship between
C&I loan growth and the use of derivatives over a sample period from 1985 to 1992.
They find that the derivative markets allow banks to increase lending activities at a
greater rate than the banks would have otherwise. Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (2001)
examine the major differences in the financial characteristics of banking organizations
that use derivatives relative to those that do not. They find that banks that use derivatives
grow their business-loan portfolio faster than banks that do not use derivatives.
Pumanandam (2004) also reports that the derivative users make more C&I loans than
non-users. There are two major research questions that arise in the literature: Does the
use of derivatives facilitate loan growth? If not, is there a negative association between
lending activity and derivative usage? Using recent data that cover a full business cycle,
this essay revisits these questions to ascertain whether a direct relationship still exists.

6
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This essay differs from the previous research in several aspects. First, it uses more
recent data. Few o f the previous research studies cover the period from 1996 through
2004. During this period, the use of interest-rate derivatives for individual banks is even
more extensive than in earlier studies, rising from notional amounts of $27.88 trillion at
the end of December 1996 to $62.78 trillion at the end of 2004.1 Given the substantial
change in the use of derivatives, the research inferences drawn in the previous studies
based on less derivative usage may not hold under the current circumstances. Therefore,
the use of more recent data in this essay will shed more light on the most recent impact of
derivative usage on bank lending activity.
Second, the sample period in this essay covers a full business cycle, thereby
providing a better indication of the relative variability of lending activities experienced
by commercial banks over this period. Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) document a
universal downward trend of C&I lending over a sample period of 1985 to 1992, a period
during which the economy experienced a significant cyclical downturn. In contrast, my
sample enables me to focus on a more comprehensive picture regarding the impact of
derivative usage on lending activity through the different stages of the business cycle,
such as economic boom and economic recession.
Finally, the definitions of several variables in the Call Reports are different prior
to 1995. For example, futures and forwards are reported together in the Call Report data.
It is more difficult for researchers to examine the effect of different derivative
instruments on a bank’s lending activities, since swaps and forwards may have different
1The notional am ount is the predeterm ined dollar principal on w hich the exchanged interest
paym ents are based. T he notional am ounts o f derivatives reported are n ot an accurate m easure o f derivative
use because o f reporting practices th at tend to overstate the actual positions held by banks. Even though
notional values do n o t reflect the m arket value o f the contracts, they are the best proxy available for the
usage and the extent o f usage o f interest-rate derivatives.
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characteristics from futures and options. The sample period of the research in this essay
(Chapter 2) is a time period over which there is a specific definition and consistent
measurement of each interest-rate derivative instrument in the Call Reports. Therefore,
the construction of these variables will be more accurate and much more detailed than the
ones used in previous studies.
The sample in this essay represents FDIC-insured commercial banks with total
assets greater than $300 million as of March 1996 that have a portfolio of C&I loans.
Following Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000), I evaluate an equation relating the
determinants of C&I lending and the impact of derivatives on C&I lending activity. The
major finding in this essay is that the interest-rate derivatives allow commercial banks to
lessen their systematic exposure to changes in interest rates, which enables banks to
increase their lending activities without increasing the total risk level faced by the banks.
This consequently increases the banks’ abilities to provide more intermediation services.
Furthermore, a positive and significant association between lending and derivative
activity indicates that the net effect of derivative use on C&I lending is complementary.
That is, the complementary effect dominates any substitution effect.
Additionally, this positive association holds for interest-rate options contracts,
forward contracts, and futures contracts, suggesting that banks using any form of these
contracts, on average, experience significantly higher growth in their C&I loan portfolios.
Furthermore, C&I loan growth is positively related to capital ratio and negatively related
to C&I loan charge-offs. The findings in this essay are confirmed after a robustness
check.
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Examining the relationship between the C&I loan growth and derivative usage
poses a potential endogeneity problem because the derivative-use decision and lending
choices may be made simultaneously. To address this problem, an instrumental-variable
approach is employed. Specifically, I estimate the probability that a bank will use
derivatives in the first-stage specification, then I use the estimated probability of
derivative usage as an instrument for derivative activity in the second-stage C&I loan
growth equation. The probit specification for this instrumental variable is based on Kim
and Koppenhaver (1992).
Chapter 2 is organized as follows: The following section describes the sample and
data sources. A discussion of the empirical specifications for commercial and industrial
lending is provided in the third section of this chapter. Next, the empirical results are
presented in the fourth section. The fifth section of this chapter provides robustness test
results, and the final section concludes the first essay of this dissertation.

Data and Sample Description
This section describes the sample selection criteria, the lending activity
experience by FDIC-insured commercial banks from the fourth quarter of 1996 through
the fourth quarter of 2004, as well as the interest-rate derivative products used by sample
banks during the nine-year sample period.
Sample Description
The sample of banks includes FDIC-insured commercial banks with total assets
greater than $300 million as of March 1996. Of these institutions, banks that have no
commercial and industrial loans are excluded. The sample ranges from 942 banks in
March of 1996 to 467 banks in December of 2004. Institutions that are liquidated during
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the sample period are included in the sample before liquidation and excluded from the
sample for the periods after liquidation. Banks that merge during the sample period are
included in the sample. By construction, the sample is therefore free from survivor bias.
Balance sheet data and interest-rate derivative-usage information are obtained from the
Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report) filed with the Federal Reserve System.
State employment data are obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
Lending Activity
Because the accessibility of credit depends importantly on banks’ roles as
financial intermediaries, loan growth is an important measure of intermediaries’
activities. Following Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000), I use C&I loan growth as a
measure of lending activity because such a measure performs a critical function in
channeling funds between the financial and the productive sectors of the economy. Table
1 presents year-end data for bank C&I loan lending activity for the sample banks from
1996 through 2004. The sample period covers a full business cycle and thereby provides
a better indication of the relative variability of lending activities experienced by the
commercial banks in different stages of a business cycle. Panels B through E report data
for four categories of institutions classified by total asset size. Corresponding to the
acceleration of C&I loans in the late 1990s, the average ratio of C&I loans to total assets
increases steadily, from 12.44 percent at the year-end of 1997 to 13.15 percent at the
year-end of 2000. Then, from year-end 2001 to year-end 2003, the average ratio of C&I
loans to total assets exhibits a downward trend, which corresponds to the economic
recession beginning in March of 2001. As panels B through E report, this pattern exists
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across different sizes of banks, with the largest decline occurring for banks having total
assets greater than $10 billion. This decline stops at year-end 2004 when the overall
economy experiences more rapid growth.
Interest-rate Derivative Products
The use of interest-rate derivatives by banks has grown dramatically in recent
years, rising from notional amounts of $27.88 trillion at the end of 1996 to $62.78 trillion
at the end of 2004. Four main categories of interest-rate derivative instruments are
examined: swaps, options, forwards, and futures. Table 2 presents the notional principal
amounts outstanding and the frequency of use of each type of interest-rate derivative by
banks from year-end 1996 through year-end 2004. As in Table 1, data are reported for the
entire sample of banks and for four subgroups of banks categorized by total asset size.
Consistent with the dramatic increase in the use of derivatives in recent years, Table 2
shows extensive participation of banks in the interest-rate derivative markets over the
nine-year sample period. Furthermore, the rapid growth in the use of various types of
derivative instruments has not been confined to large commercial banks; medium-size
and small-size banks have also experienced a tremendous increase in the participation of
derivative markets.
As shown in Table 2, during the entire sample period, the most widely used
interest-rate derivative instrument is the swap. At the end of 1996, 31.6 percent of banks
report using interest-rate swaps. By the end of 2004, the percentage using swaps rise to
37.3 percent. Over the nine-year sample period, more than 95 percent of banks with total
assets exceeding $10 billion report using interest-rate swaps.
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T able 1 L ending A ctivity B ased on Y ear-end D ata B eginning w ith 1996 T hrough 2004 for
F D IC -insured C om m ercial B anks w ith T otal A ssets G reater than $300 M illion
1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

3580.35
0.1274
942

3993.56
0.1244
818

4326.36
0.1248
728

4503.84
0.1281
677

4813.08
0.1315
602

4823.37
0.1224
561

4839.84
0.1142
522

4908.20
0.1102
497

5138.27
0.1115
467

Panel B: Total Assets < $500 million
Average Total Assets
Average C&I Loans /Total Assets
Num ber o f Observations

382.58
0.1120
366

509.77
0.1081
334

627.23
0.1077
299

697.69
0.1106
271

809.28
0.1107
247

869.97
0.1075
228

964.07
0.1008
213

1004.05
0.0965
207

1071.78
0.0967
197

Panel C: $500 million < Total A ssets < $1
billion
Average Total Assets
Average C&I Loans /Total Assets
Num ber o f Observations

685.24
0.1139
232

871.85
0.1107
208

1083.70
0.1105
185

1231.14
0.1129
176

1436.22
0.1235
155

1608.72
0.1130
146

1817.49
0.1095
135

2062.01
0.1093
134

2322.21
0.1122
129

Panel D: $1 billion < Total Assets < $10
billion
Average Total Assets
Average C&I Loans /Total Assets
Num ber o f Observations

3059.11
0.1425
281

4290.94
0.1463
226

5163.10
0.1459
198

5956.50
0.1491
186

7310.57
0.1529
159

9056.01
0.1411
151

1020.88
0.1304
140

11613.84
0.1273
122

12936.69
0.1309
108

Panel E: Total Assets > $10 billion
Average Total Assets
Average C&I Loans /Total Assets
Num ber o f Observations

3197.43
0.1982
63

5671.76
0.1916
50

6765.21
0.2022
46

7378.67
0.2079
44

8633.30
0.2036
41

9802.80
0.1766
36

1127.43
0.1504
34

123901.87
0.1361
34

142795.34
0.1332
33

Panel A: All Banks
Average Total Assets (TA)
Average C& I Loans /Total Assets
N um ber o f Observation
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T able 2 T he U se o f D erivatives B ased on Y ear-end D ata B eginning w ith 1996 T hrough 2004 for
F D IC -insured C om m ercial B anks w ith T otal A ssets G reater than $300 M illion
1996

1997

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

34.27
0.4542
19.79
0.1471
11.82
0.1584
5.47
0.2965
3.40
677

32.72
0.5307
19.60
0.1412
11.63
0.1598
4.65
0.3225
2.99
602

31.86
0.4822
16.22
0.1312
13.19
0.1502
5.53
0.4598
3.92
561

33.14
0.4982
15.52
0.1520
16.48
0.1552
5.75
0.3854
4.02
522

39.03
0.5636
14.08
0.2197
19.32
0.0931
6.24
0.4022
4.02
497

37.26
0.5812
13.49
0.2232
22.06
0.0717
6.85
0.2151
4.28
467

8.02
0.0778
4.35
0.0885
1.34
0.0288
0.00
0.00
0.00
299

10.32
0.1020
4.80
0.0972
1.85
0.0175
0.00
0.00
0.00
271

8.91
0.0540
4.45
0.0972
2.43
0.0147
0.00
0.00
0.00
247

7.02
0.0618
5.26
0.0932
3.51
0.0412
0.44
0.0333
0.00
228

10.80
0.0740
2.35
0.0313
10.37
0.0565
0.47
0.0352
0.00
213

13.53
0.0726
2.46
0.0248
10.14
0.0124
0.97
0.0383
0.00
207

15.23
0.0620
1.52
0.0165
11.17
0.0096
1.02
0.0384
0.00
197

19.45
0.0521
11.35
0.0807
5.95
0.0391
0.67
0.0057
0.00
185

21.02
0.0610
10.23
0.0972
3.98
0.0296
1.14
0.0302
0.00
176

18.71
0.0729
11.61
0.0513
5.81
0.0296
1.29
0.0301
0.00
155

17.81
0.0661
5.48
0.0304
8.22
0.0558
2.05
0.0308
0.00
146

22.96
0.0469
3.86
0.0687
13.33
0.0581
1.48
0.0508
0.74
135

29.10
0.0495
3.73
0.1480
16.42
0.0306
1.49
0.0707
0.75
134

31.00
0.0621
3.88
0.1480
22.48
0.0240
2.33
0.0247
1.55
129

1998

P a n e l A: All B anks
Users o f Swaps (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets a
Users o f Options (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets b
Users o f Forwards (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets c
Users o f Futures (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets d
Users o f swaps, options, forwards, and futures (%)
Num ber o f Observations

31.57
0.3084
16.45
0.1066
9.02
0.1926
5.28
0.4291
3.18
942

35.08
0.3341
19.19
0.1058
12.22
0.1342
5.13
0.3288
3.42
818

34.47
0.4316
19.64
0.1426
11.13
0.2017
5.36
0.4283
3.02
728

P a n e l B: T o ta l A ssets < $500 million
Users o f Swaps (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets a
Users o f Options (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets b
Users o f Forwards (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets c
Users o f Futures (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets d
U sers o f swaps, options, forwards, and futures (%)
N um ber o f Observations

7.38
0.1238
2.73
0.0952
0.43
0.0270
0.55
0.3739
0.00
366

7.78
0.0945
3.89
0.0967
1.50
0.010
0.30
0.0505
0.00
334

P a n e l C: $500 m illion < T o tal A ssets < $1 billion
Users o f Swaps (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets a
Users o f Options (%)
Average Ratio to Total A sse tsb
Users o f Forwards (%)
A verage R atio to Total Assets c
Users o f Futures (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets d
Users o f swaps, options, forwards, and futures (%)
Num ber o f Observations

19.39
0.1327
7.33
0.0731
1.42
0.0160
0.00
0.00
0.00
232

18.27
0.1007
9.62
0.0624
6.73
0.0190
0.48
0.0201
0.00
208

a The
b The
c The
d The

average
average
average
average

ratio
ratio
ratio
ratio

o f total
o f total
o f total
o f total

assets
assets
assets
assets

equals the ratio
equals the ratio
equals the ratio
equals the ratio

o f the
o f the
o f the
o f the

notional
notional
notional
notional

principal
principal
principal
principal

amount o f outstanding
amount o f outstanding
amount o f outstanding
amount o f outstanding

1999

swaps to total assets for banks reporting the use o f swaps.
options to total assets for banks reporting the use o f options.
forwards to total assets for banks reporting the use o f forwards.
futures to total assets for banks reporting the use o f futures.
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T able 2 (C ontinued) T he U se o f D erivatives B ased on Y ear-end D ata B eginning w ith 1996 T hrough 2004 for
FD IC -insured C om m ercial B anks w ith T otal A ssets G reater than $300 M illion
1996
Panel D: $1 billion < Total Assets < $10 billion
Users o f Swaps (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets a
Users o f Options (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets b
Users o f Forwards (%)
Average Ratio to Total A sse tsc
Users o f Futures (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets d
Users o f swaps, options, forwards, and futures (%)
N um ber o f Observations

56.58
0.1226
25.62
0.0620
13.52
0.0290
5.69
0.3500
2.14
281

Panel E: Total Assets > $10 billion
U sers o f Swaps (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets a
Users o f Options (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets b
Users o f Forwards (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets c
Users o f Futures (%)
Average Ratio to Total Assets d
Users o f swaps, options, forwards, and futures (%)
Num ber o f Observations

96.82
0.9196
88.89
0.1762
66.67
0.3614
50.79
0.4721
38.10
63

a The
b The
c The
d The

average
average
average
average

ratio
ratio
ratio
ratio

o f total
o f total
o f total
o f total

assets
assets
assets
assets

equals
equals
equals
equals

the
the
the
the

ratio
ratio
ratio
ratio

o f the
o f the
o f the
o f the

notional
notional
notional
notional

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

53.09
0.1245
34.51
0.0460
19.47
0.0194
6.19
0.2220
2.65
226

57.57
0.1151
33.84
0.0503
17.68
0.0468
7.03
0.1831
1.52
198

65.59
0.1037
33.87
0.0602
19.89
0.0178
6.99
0.1352
3.23
186

65.41
0.0821
35.22
0.0594
18.24
0.0199
5.66
0.0673
2.52
159

57.62
0.0991
25.83
0.0685
19.21
0.0712
5.96
0.1044
3.97
151

60.00
0.0969
26.43
0.0460
20.00
0.0753
6.43
0.1086
2.86
140

62.29
0.0990
24.59
0.0641
24.59
0.0341
7.38
0.0909
2.46
122

65.74
0.1158
22.22
0.1062
27.78
0.0536
7.41
0.0217
2.78
108

100
1.1207
92.00
0.2285
74.00
0.3313
52.00
0.4088
44.00
50

100
1.6920
91.30
0.3375
67.39
0.4568
52.17
0.5964
41.30
46

100
1.7834
90.91
0.3433
70.45
0.3780
50.00
0.4161
38.64
44

100
1.9616
87.80
0.3294
63.41
0.3945
43.90
0.4630
34.15
41

100
2.3357
88.89
0.2610
69.44
0.3221
50.00
0.4209
44.44
36

100
2.0354
91.18
0.3196
76.47
0.3617
52.94
0.4883
47.06
34

100
2.6250
91.18
0.3889
67.65
0.3033
52.94
0.5403
47.06
34

100
2.570
93.94
0.3460
66.67
0.2215
57.58
0.4493
45.5
33

1997

principal
principal
principal
principal

amount
amount
amount
amount

o f outstanding
o f outstanding
o f outstanding
o f outstanding

swaps to total assets for banks reporting the use o f swaps,
options to total assets for banks reporting the use o f options,
forwards to total assets for banks reporting the use o f forwards,
futures to total assets for banks reporting the use o f futures.

2004
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Another notable increase occurred in the forward-rate agreement (FRA) usage.
FRA is a contract that determines the rate of interest, or currency exchange rate, to be
paid or received on an obligation beginning at some future date. At the end of 1996, 9.02
percent of the sample banks report using FRAs. By the end of 2004, the percentage using
FRAs more than doubled. While the percentage of banks participating in the swaps and
forwards increased over the sample period, the proportion of banks using interest-rate
options fell. This decline is most notable between year-end 2000 and year-end 2004.
With the exception of banks with total assets greater than $10 billion, less than 7.5
percent of banks report having open positions in interest-rate futures.
Finally, less than 3 percent of the sample banks report having open positions in
interest-rate swaps, interest-rate options, interest-rate forwards, and interest-rate futures.
In contrast, nearly half of the banks with total assets greater than $10 billion report
having positions in all four types of interest-rate derivative instruments. This result
strongly suggests that large banking organizations are much more likely than small
banking organization to use derivatives. As shown in Panel E of Table 2, approximately
25 of the largest banks heavily participated in the interest-rate derivative market, a result
similar to the finding of Carter and Sinkey (1998).

Specifications of Variables
Based on the literature regarding the determinants of bank lending, this section
describes the specification for intermediation, the independent variables used in the
empirical model, and the measure of derivative activities.
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The Specification for Intermediation
The foundation of the empirical analysis in this article is the specification for
bank lending by Sharpe and Acharya (1992). They regress a measure of lending activity
on a set of possible supply and demand factors ( X jt_}). Brewer, Minton, and Moser
(2000), who studied an earlier sample of commercial banks for the period June 30, 1985,
through the end of 1992, extended the specification by adding a measure of participation
in interest-rate derivative markets ( DERIVj t ) into the equation. Following Sharpe and
Acharya (1992), I use the quarterly change in C&I loans relative to last period’s total
assets ( CILGAj,) as the dependent variable. In order to examine the relationship between
the growth in bank C&I loans and the banks’ participation in interest-rate derivative
markets, I also include various measures of participation in interest-rate derivative
markets ( DERIVj t ) in the following regression specification:
CILGAj t = f ( X j l_ v DERIVj,)

(1)

Independent Variables (Traditional
Supply and Demand Factors)
The explanatory variables represent both supply and demand factors ( X ] ( l) .
Based on the literature on the determinants of bank lending, I determine how these supply
and demand factors enter into the regression specification. First, Bemanke and Lown
(1991) and Sharpe and Acharya (1992), among others,2 relate overall loan growth to
capital requirements. In addition, Sharpe (1995) finds that there is a positive association
between bank capital and loan growth. In a more recent work, Beatty and Gron (2001)
2

E xam ples o f this literature also include H all (1993), B erger and U dell (1994), H aubrich and
W achtel (1993), H ancock and W ilcox (1994), B rinkm an and H orvitz (1995), and Peek and R osengren
(1995).
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document that, consistent with Sharpe’s finding, banks with higher capital growth
relative to assets experience greater increases in their loan portfolios, and banks with
weak capital positions are less able to increase their loan portfolios due to capital
constraints. When a bank’s capital falls short of the required amount, the bank could
attempt to raise the capital-to-asset ratio by reducing its assets (the denominator of the
ratio) rather than raising capital (the numerator of the ratio). One way of doing this is to
shift the asset portfolio away from lending, such as cutting back its investment in C&I
loans. Banks may choose this strategy over equity issuance simply because issuing equity
is costly.3 Therefore, undercapitalized banks are less able to increase their loan portfolios
while satisfying the regulatory capital requirements. In contrast, banks with stronger
capital positions have more room to expand their loan portfolios and still be able to
satisfy the regulatory requirement for the capital-to-asset ratio. If capital-constrained
banks adjust their lending to meet some predetermined target capital-to-asset ratios, one
would expect a positive relationship between a bank’s capital-to-asset ratio and C&I loan
growth. In order to control for the effect of capital requirements on C&I lending activity,
a measure of the bank’s capital-to-asset ratio (CARATIO) is included in the empirical
specification for C&I loan growth. CARATIO is measured as the ratio of a bank’s total
equity capital to total assets at time t-1.
Another factor found to affect loan growth is the quality of a bank’s loan portfolio.
Following Sharpe and Acharya (1992), I use C&I loan charge-offs (CILCOFA) as a

3

For exam ple, Stein (1998), am ong others, show s that asym m etric inform ation betw een investors
and a b ank causes adverse selection problem s that m ake issuing new equity costly.
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proxy for loan quality.4 The variable CILCOFA is constructed as the ratio of C&I loan
charge-offs in the last period (t-1) to total assets in the last period (t-1). Charge-offs
usually rise during a recession and decline only after an economic recovery. Therefore, a
low charge-offs ratio can also be a signal of a favorable economic environment in a
bank’s geographic region of operations. In addition, the ratio of C&I loan charge-offs to
total assets could capture the impact of regulatory pressures on loan growth because
regulators often apply pressure to banks to increase their rates of charge-offs. For
example, capital-constrained banks may be required to increase their rates of charge-offs
so that they can clear the regulatory hurdle for capital ratios by eliminating some of their
assets.5 Therefore, the ratio of C&I loan charge-offs to total assets could reflect the
impact of regulatory pressures on banks’ capital management. Each of these reasons
suggests that those banks with high charge-offs should, other things being equal, be
viewed as less well capitalized than banks with low charge-offs, and are therefore less
able to increase their loan portfolios due to capital constraints. For these reasons, one
would expect CILCOFA to have a negative association with C&I loan growth.
The relationship between bank health and regional economic conditions is another
factor to consider. The idea that regional economic performance affects bank health is
intuitive and broadly consistent with the aggregate banking data.6 Avery and Gordy

4

A nother m easure o f loan quality is the provision for loan losses. T he reason that charge-offs is
used instead o f provision for loan losses is because the loan charge-offs variable also captures the im pact o f
regulatory influence.
5K im and K ross (1998) and A hm ed, Takeda, and Thom as (1999), am ong others, find evidence
that regulatory capital and earnings outcom es influence m anagers’ discretion in charge-offs, loan loss
provisions, and m iscellaneous gains.
6For exam ple, D aly, K rainer, and L opez (2003) show that there is a significant trackable link
betw een regional econom ic perform ance and bank health. A lso, Berger, B onim e, Covitz, and H ancock
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(1998) find that one-half of the change in bank loan performance from 1984 to 1995 can
be explained with a group of state-level economic variables. Also, Bemanke and Lown
(1991) and Williams-Stanton (1996) point out that regional economic conditions should
influence bank C&I loan growth. The intuition is that banks in states with weak economic
conditions are likely to have fewer profitable opportunities than banks in states with
stronger economies. The state employment growth rate ( EMPGj

) is included in the

model as a proxy for local economic conditions that are not captured by the other
explanatory variables.7 If state employment growth is a proxy for economic conditions,
one would expect EMPG to be positively related to C&I loan growth, other things being
equal.
Measure of Derivative Activities
In order to capture the effects of derivative usage on bank-loan growth, I include
various measures o f participation in interest-rate derivative markets ( DERIVj t ) in the
C&I loan growth specification (the construction of this variable is presented in equation
2). The coefficient estimate on DERIV reflects the impact of derivative usage conditional
on adequately incorporating the intermediating process in the remaining terms of the
specification. Modem theories of the intermediary role of banks describe how derivative
contracting and lending can be complementary activities. Diamond (1984) develops a
theory of financial intermediation. In his model, banks optimally offer debt contracts to
“depositors” and accept debt contracts from “entrepreneurs.” Depositors delegate
monitoring activities to banks that have the ability to economize the costs of monitoring
(2000) docum ent th at aggregate state-level and regional-level variables are im portant contributors to the
persistence in firm -level perform ance (i.e., return on assets) observed in th e U .S. banking industry.
7See C alom iris and M ason (2000), A very and G ordy (1998), an d B erger et al. (2000).
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loan contracts made with entrepreneurs. However, banks face an incentive problem that
originates from the cost of delegated monitoring on behalf of their depositors. Diamond
shows that diversification within a bank lowers the cost of delegated monitoring. An
implication of his model is that banks should not assume any nondiversifiable risks
unless they have special advantages in managing them. Thus in his model, banks find it
optimal to hedge all interest-rate risk by interest-rate derivatives.8 However, even after
diversifying, banks may still face systematic risks that cannot be diversified away.
Diamond demonstrates that derivative contracts can serve as a third form of
contracting, which enables banks to reduce their exposure to systematic risk in their loan
portfolios. This use of derivative contracts to hedge systematic risks enables banks to
obtain further reductions in delegation costs, and, in turn, allows banks to intermediate
more effectively. Empirically, Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996) find that there is a
negative correlation between risk and derivative usage for savings and loan institutions.
In fact, they find that S&Ls that use derivatives experience relatively greater growth in
their fixed-rate mortgage portfolios. Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) examine the
relationship between lending and derivative usage for an earlier sample of FDIC-insured
commercial banks. Their results indicate that banks using interest-rate derivatives, on
average, experience significantly higher growth in their C&I loan portfolios. These
results are consistent with the notion that derivative usage would help banks better cope
with interest-rate risk and thereby enable them to hold more loans to earn more income
from their lending activity. If interest-rate derivative activity complements the lending

8See P um anandam (2004).
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activity as predicted by Diamond’s (1984) model, one would expect a positive coefficient
estimate on the DERIV variable.
In this essay, a downward trend in C&I lending during the economic recession
beginning in March of 2001 is observed. Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) also
document a similar pattern regarding C&I lending over a sample period from 1985 to
1992, a period during which the economy experienced a significant cyclical downturn.
They argue that the downward trend in lending activity and the concurrent increase in the
use of interest-rate derivatives suggest that derivative usage might be a substitute for
lending activity. They suggest that a negative relationship between derivative usage and
lending activity could arise in two cases. The first case is when banks use derivatives for
speculative purposes. Gain from speculating on interest-rate changes would enhance
revenues from bank trading desks. The second instance is when banks charge a fee as
over-the-counter dealers for placing derivative positions. Pursuit of either of these
activities as a replacement for the traditional lending activities of banks would imply that
derivative activity would be a substitute for lending activity. If these activities were
substitutes, one would expect a negative coefficient on the DERIV variable.
From the above discussion, a specification for Equation (2) can be written as
follows:
CILGA,, = « „ + £ a,D, + P£ARATIOjt_, + PfILCOFA,
(2 )

2

+P3EMPGJt_l + pADERIVJ I+ sjl
In Equation (2), CILGAJt is measured as the quarterly change in C&I loans relative to last
period’s total assets. Dt is a time-indicator variable equal to one for period t, or zero
otherwise. The variable CARATIOj

is the ratio of a bank’s total equity capital to total
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assets in the previous period (t-1). CILCOFA.

is the ratio of C&I loan charge-offs in the

previous period (t-1) to total assets in the previous period (t-1). EMPGJ

is the state

employment growth rate relative to last period (t-1), where EMP equals total employment
in the state in which the bank’s headquarters are located. The variable DERIVjt is a
measure of participation in interest-rate derivative markets.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the variables used in the estimation of
Equation (2). The mean of quarter-to-quarter changes in C&I loans scaled by values of
beginning-of-quarter total assets is 0.4 percent over the full sample period. During this
period, the average capital-to-asset ratio is 9.45 percent, the average C&I loan chargeoffs over assets is 0.05 percent, and the average state employment growth rate is 0.45
percent. Consistent with the data presented in Table 2, 20.78 percent of the sample banks
reported using interest-rate swaps during the sample period, 11.26 percent of the sample
banks reported using interest-rate options, and 8.61 percent reported using FRAs. Only
3.28 percent of the sample banks reported using interest-rate futures. Finally, over-thecounter dealers and subsidiaries of foreign banks comprise only 1.2 percent and 4.5
percent, respectively, of the sample bank observations.
Instrumental Variable
Examining the relationship between the C&I loan growth and derivative usage
poses a potential endogeneity problem because the derivative-use decision and lending
choices may be made simultaneously. As the data show, the decisions could be made
jointly since a bank’s C&I lending activity might affect its decision to use derivatives. To
address this problem, an instrumental-variable approach is used.
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Table 3 Sum m ary Statistics for the Full Sam ple a
Variable

M nemonic

Dependent variable and supply and demand factors
Dependent variable
C&I Loan Grow th over total assets

CILGA

Supply and demand factors
Capital to asset ratio
C&I loan charge-offs over assets
Employment growth
Log total assets

M ean

Standard
Deviation

Observations

0.004

0.0525

293568

CARATIO
CILCOFA
EM PG
LNTOTASST

0.0945
0.0005
0.0043
13.75

0.0460
0.0012
0.0727
1.2323

248278
232234
248277
293536

Additional supply and dem and factors used in robustness tests
Lagged dependent variable
Unused credit lines to total assets

Defined Above
UNLC

0.0092

0.0233

224571

Classification Variable
Swaps (0-Yes, 1-No)
Futures (0-Yes, 1-No)
Forwards (0-Yes, 1-No)
Options (0-Yes, 1-No)
Derivatives D ealer (0-No, 1-Yes)
Foreign Bank (0-No, 1-Yes)

DSW AP
DFUTURES
DFORW ARD
DO PTION
DEALER
FBA NK

0.2078
0.0328
0.0861
0.1126
0.0120
0.0453

0.4057
0.1782
0.2805
0.3161
0.1082
0.2081

294475
294475
294475
294475
294475
294475

“Means and standard deviations for all variables are used in the empirical analyses. The statistics are computed over the period
from M arch 1996 through D ecem ber 2004.
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The probit specification for the instrumental variable is based on Kim and
Koppenhaver (1992).9 This probit specification includes the log of bank assets, the
capital-to-asset ratio, net interest margin, and the first lag of the dependent variable.
Commercial bank size as measured by the logarithm of its total assets is included to
control for the differences in derivative use that might be caused by differences in the
types of businesses and customers at large and small banks.10 The capital-to-asset ratio is
included in the probit specification because a bank’s capital adequacy is a necessary
condition for its participation in the derivative market. A bank’s net interest margin enters
into the equation because banks can use derivatives to lock-in the spread between interest
income and interest expense. Since derivative use at time t is usually dependent on
derivative use at time t-1, the first lag of the dependent variable is included to take into
account the dependence over time. To determine the probability of a bank’s derivative
usage, the above probit specification for each sample date t is estimated, and then the
estimated probability from the first-stage estimation is used as an instrument for
derivative activity in the second-stage estimation.11 The results of this first-stage
regression are presented in Appendix A. Overall, the probit results show that, as
predicted, bank size, capital-to-asset ratio, and the lagged dependent variable play a
significant role in determining the probability of derivative usage by U.S. commercial
banks.

9

Brew er, M inton, and M oser (2000) use a sim ilar probit specification in their study.
10Previous literature finds that size is an im portant indicator in a b an k ’s derivative activities; e.g.,
Sinkey and C arter (1997), K im and K oppenhaver (1992), and G unther and Siem s (1996).
11A H ausm an test indicates that the instrum ental variable is a valid instrum ent.
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Since banks’ use of derivatives increases during the sample period, a pooled
cross-sectional time-series regression is employed to incorporate this dynamic effect.

12

Specifically, I run a cross-sectional Ordinary Least Squares regression with C&I loan
growth as the dependent variable and then report the time-series means of the parameter
estimates and their corresponding t-statistics. The t-values are computed using NeweyWest heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent errors. I use the predicted
derivative use, obtained from the probit specification, to instrument the actual derivativeuse variable as an independent variable.

Empirical Results
Using the quarterly change in C&I loans relative to last period’s total assets as the
dependent variable, I utilize Equation (2) to examine the determinants of C&I lending
and the impact of derivatives on C&I lending activity. Table 4 reports the results of
pooled cross-sectional time-series regressions using quarterly data from March 1996
through December 2004.
Regression (1) of Table 4 is the reduced form of the supply equation that
examines the impact of fundamental factors on C&I lending activity. This regression
serves as a base for examining the relationship between derivative activity and C&I
lending. In regression (1), C&I loan growth is significantly and positively related to the
beginning-of-period CARATIO. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that capitalconstrained banks adjust their loan portfolios in subsequent periods to meet some
predetermined target capital-to-asset ratios. Similar to Brewer, Minton, and Moser
(2000), I also find a significant, negative association between CILCOFA and C&I loan

12

A ppendix B provides the coefficient on the tim e-period indication variables.
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T able 4 U nivariate M ultiple R egression C oefficient E stim ates for the D eterm inants o f Q uarterly Changes
in C & I L oans R elative to L ast P erio d ’s T otal A ssets a’b
Independent variables
CARATIO
CILCOFA
EMPG

Regression (1)
0.1037
(3.48) ***
-0.8336
(-3.65)***
0.0046
(0.37)

DERIV

Regression (2 )
0.1041
(3.47) **’
-0.8569
(-3.77)***
0.0045
(0.36)
0.0023
(2.83) ***

Regression (3)
0.1042
(3.47) ***
-0.8603
(-3.79) ***
0.0045
(0.36)

0.0012
(1.30)
0.0028
(2.90) ***
0.0119
(2.04) **
0.0021
(1.90) **
-0.0201
(-1.68) *
-0.0011
(-0.62)
-0.0002
(-0.09)
0.0087
(-1.32)
-0.0020
(-0.26)
-0.0023
(-0.86)
0.0188
(1.41)
0.0087
(0.43)
0.0082
(0.74)
0.0011
(0.30)
-0.0163
(-0.73)

SWAPS
OPTIONS
FUTURES
FORWARDS
OF
OS
OW
FS
FW
SW
OFS
OFW
FSW
SWO
OFSW
DEALER
FOREIGN
LAGGED CILGA
UNLC
OBSERVATIONS
ADJ R-SQUARE

Regression (4)
0.0791
(2.16) **
-0.8124
(-3.55)***
0.0103
(0.96)
0.0022
(2.05) **

232096
0.00566

232096
0.00416

232096
0.00424

-0.0081
(-3.54) ***
-0.0059
(-3.11)***
0.0054
(1.41)
0.0466
(4.07) ***
223881
0.00573

“All regression equations contain time-period indicator variables. T-statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated using NeweyWest heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent errors. Statistical significance is displayed by the use of one (10%), two (5%),
or three (1%) stars. The sample contains 36 quarters of observations from 1996 Q1 through 2004 Q4. The dependent variable for all
regressions is the quarterly change in C&I loans relative to last period’s total assets.
bCARATIO is measured as the ratio of total equity capital to total assets at time t-1. CILCOFA is measured as the ratio o f C&I loan
charge-offs in period t-1 to total assets in period t-1. EMPG is the state employment growth rate, where EMP equals the total
employment in the state in which the bank’s headquarters are located. DERIV, SWAPS, OPTIONS, FORWARDS, and FUTURES are
instrumental variables obtained from a probit specification for participation in the indicated derivative markets. OF, OS, OW, FS,
FW, SW, OFS, OFW, FSW, SWO, and OFSW are eleven possible interactions between each type o f derivative instruments. Among
these interaction terms, O stands for option, F stands for futures, S stands for swaps, and W stands for forwards. DEALER is a binary
variable, which equals to one if the institution is listed as an IDSA member, or zero otherwise. FOREIGN is a binary variable, which
equals to one if the institution is a foreign-owned institution, or zero otherwise. LAGGED CILGA is the first lag of the dependent
variable. UNLC is unused lines of credit to total assets.
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growth. This negative relationship is consistent with the notion that the charge-offs
variable captures the impact of regulatory pressures, a strong economic environment, or
both. The previous period’s state employment growth variable EMPG fails to enter the
equation significantly. This result is inconsistent with Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000),
who study a sample of banks that predates the advent of interstate banking. During the
course of the 1990s, deregulation in the banking industry led to consolidation and to
banks’ geographic expansion. As a result, U.S. banks have also become more
geographically diversified. In fact, the regression results might suggest that state
economies play a lesser role in affecting banks’ health and performance following the full
expansion of interstate banking.
Regressions (2) and (3) include different measures of derivative activity.
Regression (2) augments the predicted probability of derivative usage in any type of
interest-rate derivative contract (DERIV). Regression (3) decomposes the DERIV
variable into four types of interest-rate derivative instruments: SWAPS, OPTIONS,
FORWARDS, and FUTURES. Each type of derivative activity is estimated using the
probit specification discussed earlier in this section. The estimates generated in the probit
specification are then used in conjunction with the supply and demand factors in the
second-stage regression to predict C&I loan growth.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 4 report the estimation results for the derivativeaugmented regressions. First, the coefficient estimates on CARATIO, CILCOFA, and
EMPG are qualitatively similar to those in the base model. Second, the CARATIO and
CILCOFA coefficient estimates remain statistically significant.
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Regression (2) of Table 4 shows that banks using any type of interest-rate
derivative, on average, experience significantly higher growth in their C&I loan
portfolios.13 This positive relationship between derivatives use and C&I loan growth is
consistent with Diamond’s (1984) model of financial intermediation. In that model,
Diamond argues that interest-rate derivatives allow commercial banks to lessen their
systematic exposure to changes in interest rates. In addition, interest-rate derivatives
create extra risk tolerance, enabling banks to provide more C&I loans without increasing
the total risk level faced by the banks. Furthermore, a positive and significant coefficient
estimate on the DERIV variable indicates that the net effect of derivative use on C&I
lending activity is complementary. That is, the complementary effect dominates any
substitution effect.
The regression reported in column (3) of Table 4 examines the relative role
played by each type of derivative instrument in explaining C&I loan growth. Since banks
that invest in the human capital and internal control systems necessary to be active in the
market for derivatives are more likely to use more than one type of derivative,14 I also
control for the effect of eleven possible interactions between each type of derivative
activity in the regression.15 The results show that the coefficient estimates on all four
kinds of derivative variables are positive. The coefficient estimates on OPTIONS,
FORWARDS, and FUTURES are statistically significant. These results suggest that the
13

W hen the actual derivative use rather than the predicted derivative use is included in the C&I
loan growth specification, the coefficient estim ate (not reported) on D E R IV is positive and m arginally
significant at the 10% level. The actual derivatives-use indicator variable is a binary variable equal one if a
bank engages in any interest-rate derivative activity, or zero otherwise.
14See C arter and Sinkey (1998).
15See Table 4 for a detailed breakdow n o f interaction term s.
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use of these three types (Options, Forwards, and Futures) of derivatives is significantly
associated with higher C&I loan growth. Further, except for the interaction between
options and futures, none of the coefficient estimates on the interaction terms between
each type of derivative activity is significant.16 Overall, my results suggest that aggregate
use of derivative instruments, in particular interest-rate options, interest-rate futures, and
interest-rate forwards, is associated with higher growth rates in C&I loans.

Robustness Check
To check the validity of the regression results, I augment the regression (2)
specification by adding variables measuring other characteristics of financial institutions
that may explain lending activity during the sample period. The augmented regression
reported in column (4) of Table 4 addresses the concern of omitting important variables
that might alter the observed positive relationship between lending activity and
participation in interest-rate derivatives.
First, the lagged dependent variable (LAGGED CILGA) is included in the
regression to account for the possibility that the derivative-participation variable is a
proxy for growth potential. I also include a control for a foreign-firm effect by
introducing a binary variable equal to one if a bank is a subsidiary of a foreign financial
institution (FOREIGN), or zero otherwise. Previous literature suggests that the operation
of foreign-owned banks helps to fund U.S. operations of foreign industrial firms.

17

Therefore, foreign-owned banks may be expected to provide both loans and interest-rate

16W ithout the interaction term s, the coefficient estim ates (not rep o rted ) on all four kinds o f
derivative instrum ents have a positive sign, and the estim ates on options and forw ards are statistically
significant.
17

F or exam ple, see B hattacharaya (1993).
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derivatives to their customers, inducing a positive coefficient. On the other hand, foreignowned banks also have some disadvantages due to problems in managing from a distance
and coping with multiple economic/regulatory environment.

1R

These disadvantages may

cause foreign-owned banks to experience slower growth in their loan portfolios, other
things being equal.
In consideration of the possibility of a spurious relationship between C&I loan
growth and dealer activity performed by large banks that are heavily involved in
derivative contracting, a binary variable is included in the regression to control for
membership in the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). The binary
variable DEALER equals one if a bank is identified as a dealer by the ISDA membership
list,19 or zero otherwise.
Finally, the ratio of the dollar value of any unused lines of credit (UNLC) to total
assets is included as a measure of risk tolerance. The risk is two-dimensional. First,
liquidity problems may emerge as banks commit to fill larger credit lines. Second, banks’
off-balance-sheet exposures to credit risk may increase as they extend lines of credit to
manage the interest-rate risk. Controls introduced for these possibilities provide a way of
separating loan growth from risk-taking motivations.
Regression (4) incorporates the above proxies for other activities that may cloud
the positive association between derivative activity and loan growth. As shown in column
(4) of Table 4, the results of the study remain robust. Specifically, the coefficient on
predicted derivative activity (DERIV) remains positive and statistically significant. In
addition, the coefficient on the foreign-bank variable (FOREIGN) is negative and highly
18

19

For exam ple, see B erger, D ai, O ngena, and Sm ith (2003) and B uch (2003).
ISD A m em bership list is available at http://w w w .isda.org.
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significant, suggesting that foreign-owned banks experience slower growth in C&I loan
lending activities. As Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) suggest, dealer activities
performed by the banks could give rise to a negative relationship between derivative
usage and lending because banks enhance their revenue by acting as over-the-counter
(OTC) dealers and charge a fee for placing derivative positions. Consistent with their
prediction, the coefficient on the dealer variable is negative and significant. Finally, the
coefficient estimate on the lagged dependent variable is not significantly different from
zero. The ratio of unused lines of credit to total assets, UNLC, is positive and significant,
suggesting that the higher the risk tolerance as measured by UNLC, the greater the C&I
loan growth.

Conclusions
Commercial banks employ different methods, including the use of interest-rate
derivatives to manage interest-rate risks. The use of these derivative instruments by banks
has increased tremendously in the past decade, rising from notional amounts of $27.88
trillion at the end of December of 1996 to $62.78 trillion at the end of 2004. The
relationship between derivative usage and lending activity has been studied in related
literature in recent years. This essay addresses the question of whether derivative usage
complements or substitutes for the lending activity, investigates the relationship between
bank participation in derivative contracting and bank lending for the period of March 31,
1996, through December 31, 2004.
Overall, this essay (Chapter 2) documents a direct relationship between derivative
usage by U.S. banks and growth in their commercial and industrial loan portfolios. More
specifically, I find that aggregate use of derivative instruments, in particular interest-rate
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options, interest-rate futures, and interest-rate forwards, is associated with higher growth
rates in C&I loans. These findings are consistent with the results of an earlier study by
Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000), who examine the relationship between lending and
derivative usage for a sample of FDIC-insured commercial banks between 1985 and 1992.
This documented positive association is consistent with Diamond’s (1984) hypothesis
that derivative contracting and lending are complementary activities. Diamond’s model
predicts that banks can reduce the cost of delegated monitoring by holding a diversified
portfolio. Engaging in derivative activities helps banks reduce the cost of monitoring
contracts issued to their loan customers, thereby enabling banks to increase their lending
activities without increasing the total risk level faced by the banks.
In addition, these results suggest that C&I loan growth has a significant positive
relationship with the capital ratio. These results are consistent with the previous banking
research in that banks with stronger capital are more able to increase their loan portfolios.
I also document a negative relationship between C&I loan charge-offs and C&I loan
growth. This negative association is in line with the notion that the charge-offs variable
captures the impact of regulatory pressures or a strong economic environment, or both.
Further, the main results are confirmed after a robustness check.
Finally, the sample shows that less than 3 percent of the sample banks report
having open positions in all four kinds of interest-rate derivative instruments. In contrast,
nearly half of the banks with total assets greater than $10 billion report having positions
in all four kinds of interest-rate derivative instruments. This result strongly suggests that
large banking organizations are much more likely than small banking organizations to
fully utilize derivatives.
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CHAPTER 3
USE OF INTEREST-RATE DERIVATIVES AND
BANK HOLDING COMPANY
INTEREST-RATE RISK
Introduction
One of the most important forms of risk that banks face as financial
intermediaries is interest-rate risk. Interest-rate risk arises from mismatches in the rate
sensitivity of the bank’s inflows and outflows. A special function of a financial institution
is asset transformation, which involves buying primary securities or assets (such as
mortgages, loans, and securities) and issuing secondary securities or liabilities (such as
certificates of deposit and federal funds borrowing) to fund asset purchases. Inflows from
assets often have maturity and liquidity characteristics different from outflows from
liabilities. Financial institutions potentially expose themselves to interest-rate risk in
mismatching the maturities of assets and liabilities.
The interest-rate risk is the risk that a bank’s income and/or market value will be
adversely affected by changes in interest rates. In addition to potential refinancing or
reinvestment problems that occur when interest rates change, a bank faces market-value
risk as well. For example, mismatching maturities by holding longer-term assets than

33

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

34
liabilities means that when interest rates rise, the market value of the bank’s assets falls
by a greater amount than its liabilities. This mismatching of maturities exposes the bank
to the risk of economic loss and, potentially, the risk of insolvency.
Managing Interest-rate Risk
Commercial banks manage interest-rate risk using two major techniques. One is
to match the maturity of their assets and liabilities as closely as possible (on-balancesheet technique); the other technique is to use interest-rate derivatives (off-balance-sheet
technique).
Traditionally, banks use maturity gaps to predict how their net interest margin, or
accounting earnings, would be affected by changes in market interest rates. If the changes
in revenue from assets perfectly match the changes in expense from liabilities, then a rise
or fall in interest rates will have an equal and offsetting effect on both sides of the
balance sheet. In principle, perfect matching leaves a bank’s earnings or market value
unaffected by changes in interest rates. Flannery and James (1984) provide evidence on
the importance of the maturity gap by examining the relationship between the interestrate sensitivity of common stock returns and the maturity gap between interest-ratesensitive assets and liabilities. In the financial institution industry, a commonly used
measure of on-balance-sheet maturity composition is an institution’s one-year maturity
gap. This measure reflects the short-term maturity mismatch of the institution’s assets and
liabilities (Schrand, 1997).
Since the 1980s, derivative instruments have become an increasingly important
product used by banking institutions to manage their interest-rate risk exposure. The rise
in derivative usage arises from the fact that derivatives provide a relatively inexpensive
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means for banks to change their interest-rate risk exposure. In theory, the existence of an
active derivative market should increase the potential for banking firms to attain their
desired level of interest-rate risk exposure. Diamond (1984) develops a theory of
financial intermediation in which banks have monitoring advantages as compared to
small depositors. He shows that diversification within a bank lowers the cost of delegated
monitoring and generates net benefits of intermediation services. An implication of
Diamond’s model is that banks should not assume any nondiversifiable risk unless they
have special advantages in monitoring them. Thus in Diamond’s model, banks find it
optimal to hedge interest-rate risk by using interest-rate derivatives.
Previous Studies
Even though the potential for using derivative instruments in hedging interest-rate
risk is widely recognized, the tremendous increase in the use of derivatives by banks has
triggered regulators’ concerns as to whether banking firms have used derivatives
primarily for hedging or for speculation. Much research focuses on the role played by
derivatives, but there is no clear answer regarding which of these two alternatives,
hedging or speculation, is more likely.
A major concern facing policymakers and bank regulators today is the possibility
that the rising use of derivatives has increased the riskiness of individual banks and of the
banking system as a whole. A number of studies have examined the relationship between
interest-rate risk exposure and banks’ derivative usage. The evidence from previous
studies is mixed. Sinkey and Carter (1994), Tufano and Headley (1994), and Gunther and
Siems (1996) find a significant, negative relationship between the balance sheet “gap”
measures of interest-rate risk exposure—the difference between assets and liabilities that
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mature or re-price within a specified time-period—and the extent of derivative usage by
banks. These research articles have documented evidence that is consistent with the idea
that increased use of derivatives by banks tends to result in higher levels of interest-rate
risk exposure. Hirtle (1997) studies a sample of 139 bank holding companies and finds
that holdings of derivatives are associated with significantly greater interest-rate exposure
for the sample period of 1991 to 1994. These findings are consistent with the idea that the
derivative instruments act as substitutes for on-balance-sheet sources of interest-rate risk
exposure rather than as a hedge.
In contrast to these studies, Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996) find a negative
correlation between risk and derivative usage by savings and loan institutions. Ahmed,
Beatty, and Takeda (1997) find that for the majority of derivative users, derivative usage
reduces interest-rate exposure. Schrand (1997) finds that derivative activities are
negatively associated with stock-price interest-rate sensitivity for a sample of publicly
traded savings and loan associations (S&Ls). The results also indicate that S&Ls, on
average, use derivatives to hedge interest-rate risk rather than to speculate. Brewer,
Minton, and Moser (2000) evaluate an equation relating the determinants of Commercial
and Industrial (C&I) lending and the impact of derivatives on C&I loan lending activity.
They find that engaging in derivative activities helps banks reduce the delegation costs of
monitoring contracts issued by their loan customers, thereby enabling banks to increase
their lending activities without increasing the total risk level faced by the banks. Brewer,
Jackson, and Moser (2001) examine the major differences in the financial characteristics
of banking organizations that use derivatives relative to those that do not. They find that
banks that use derivatives grow their business loan portfolio faster than banks that do not
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use derivatives. The first essay of this dissertation (Chapter 2) investigates the
relationship between bank participation in derivative contracting and bank lending for the
period March 31, 1996, through December 31, 2004. I find that the aggregate use of
derivative instruments, in particular interest-rate options, interest-rate futures, and
interest-rate forwards, is associated with higher growth rates in C&I loans. This
documented positive association is consistent with Diamond’s (1984) hypothesis that
derivative contracting and lending are complementary activities. Minton, Stulz, and
Williamson (2005) examine the use of credit derivatives by U.S. bank holding companies
from 1999 to 2003. They find that credit derivatives make it easier for banks to maximize
their value with less capital, thereby reducing the cost of loans for bank customers. Their
results are also consistent with the prediction of hedging theories. These studies suggest
that banks use derivatives for hedging purposes rather than substituting for traditional onbalance-sheet activity.
Following the lead of previous research, I test Diamond’s (1984) hypothesis that
derivative instruments allow banks to better manage their interest-rate risk exposure.
Specifically, I examine the role of derivatives in determining the interest-rate sensitivity
of bank holding companies’ (BHC) net worth, while controlling for the influence of onbalance-sheet activities and other bank-specific characteristics.
Contribution to the Literature
This essay (Chapter 3) differs from the previous literature in several aspects. First,
it uses more recent data. Few of the previous studies covered the period from 1996
through 2003. During this period, interest-rate derivative usage for individual banks was
much more extensive than found in earlier studies. For example, the notional amount of
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derivative holdings by banks rose from $27.88 trillion at the end of December 1996 to
$62.78 trillion at the end of 2004. Given the substantial increase in the use of derivatives,
the inferences that can be drawn may be clearer than in previous research. Therefore, the
use of more recent data in this chapter sheds more light on the effect of derivative usage
on banks’ interest-rate risk exposure. Further, beginning with the third quarter of 1997,
the Federal Reserve’s Report of Condition and Income provides greater detail of banks’
assets and liabilities, reporting those that are due to mature or re-price within one year.

20

Therefore, construction of a maturity-gap variable will be more accurate and much more
detailed than those used in previous studies.
Second, the sample period in this essay (Chapter 3) covers a full business cycle,
thereby providing evidence for interest-rate changes experienced during both economic
expansions and economic contractions. Schrand (1997) studies a sample of publicly
traded savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and documents a universal downward trend
of interest rates over a sample period of 1984 to 1988. Hirtle (1997), on the other hand,
examines a sample of bank holding companies for the sample period of 1991 to 1994, a
period during which the economy experienced increased interest rates. In contrast, the
sample in this essay provides a more comprehensive picture regarding the impact of
derivative usage on the interest-rate sensitivity of bank holding companies through the
different stages of the business cycle; in particular, the different interest-rate
environments associated with economic expansion and contraction.
Finally, previous studies shed light on the statistical relationship between
derivative usage and banks’ interest-rate risk exposure; none, however, presents evidence

20

The increase in derivative usage also increases the im portance o f establishing how these
instrum ents are being utilized.
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on the economic significance of derivative instruments in shaping banks’ interest-rate
exposure. The major finding in this essay is that stock returns of bank holding companies
using derivatives are less sensitive to interest-rate changes after controlling for balancesheet composition and asset size. This result is both statistically and economically
significant. In fact, the sample results in this essay suggest that an average-size bank
holding company would have to increase its capital by $209.37 million to shift the
interest-rate beta down by 35 basis points, if it did not use interest-rate derivatives to
hedge its interest-rate risk.
This essay (Chapter 3) is organized as follows: The next section describes the
sample and data sources (Data Sources and Construction of the Maturity-gap Variable).
A discussion of the econometric methods used then follows (Econometric Methods).
Next, the empirical results are presented (Empirical Results) followed by robustness test
results (Robustness Checks). The final section of this Chapter provides the conclusions
and policy implications relevant to this essay.

Data Sources and Construction
of the Maturity-gap Variable
This section describes the data sources used in this essay (Chapter 3) and the
construction of the one-year maturity-gap variable. In the financial institution industry, a
commonly used measure of on-balance-sheet maturity composition is an institution’s
one-year maturity gap, a measure that reflects the short-term maturity mismatch of the
institution’s assets and liabilities. Even though the one-year gap imperfectly represents
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interest-rate risk exposure, it is the best proxy for the duration of a bank holding
company’s portfolio, given the available data.

21

Data Sources
The stock return data and interest-rate data as well as the balance sheet data and
derivative data from 1998 through 2003 are obtained from the following sources:
(1) Market return data (Friday of each week) are obtained from the Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value-weighted indices covering the
period from January 1998 through December 2003. Bank return data are
obtained from CRSP.
(2) Interest-rate data (yield on the constant-maturity one-year Treasury security)
are obtained from the FRED II database at the Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis.
(3) The balance sheet data and derivative data are obtained from the Reports of
Condition and Income filed with the Federal Reserve System (Call Reports).
Construction of the One-year
Maturity-gap Variable
I follow the approach of Pumanandam (2004) and construct a 12-month gap
measure (SHORT). Figure 1 shows the detailed construction of the one-year maturity-gap
variable. This measure captures the net imbalances in effective maturity (i.e., adjusted for
re-pricing terms) of the assets and liabilities of a bank over a one-year period. Beginning
with the third quarter of 1997, Call Reports filed with the Federal Reserve System
provide a detailed account of banks’ assets and liabilities that are due to mature or re21

D uration is a superior m easure o f interest-rate risk exposure. First, duration is a m easure o f the
average life o f a security because it recognizes that not all o f the cash flow from a typical security occurs at
its maturity. Second, duration also expresses the elasticity o f a security’s p rice relative to changes in the
interest rate and m easures a security’s responsiveness to changes in m arket in terest rates.
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price within a year. The measure used in this essay (Chapter 3) is comparable to the
SHORT used by Flannery and James (1984) and is defined as the absolute value of assets
maturing or re-pricing within a year minus liabilities that mature or re-price within a year
scaled by the total assets of the bank. A one-year maturity gap is constructed as shown
below:
Loans and Leases Due to Mature

Term Deposits Due to Mature

or Re-price Within a Year
+

or Re-price Within a Year
+

Securities Due to Mature or Re-price

Fed Funds Borrowed
+

Within a Year
+

Other Liabilities for Borrowed

Fed Funds Sold

Funds
+

+
Customer's Liabilities to the Bank for

Bank's Liabilities on Customer's

Outstanding Acceptance

Outstanding Acceptance

Figure 1 Construction of the One-year M aturity Gap

This number, the one-year maturity gap, is scaled by the total assets of the bank in
order to compute the one-year maturity-gap-to-asset ratio (ASHORT), since an
appropriate scale variable is required to put the dollar measure of maturity mismatch in
the same unit of measurement as the measure of interest-rate sensitivity.

Econometric Methods
The foundation of the empirical analysis is the two-factor market model of
Flannery and James (1984) who measure the interest-rate sensitivity for a sample of
actively traded commercial banks and savings and loan associations during the period
1976 to 1981. In the two-factor market model regression, Flannery and James relate bank
j ’s common stock returns to the returns on the market and an interest-rate term designed
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to capture changes in interest rates. The coefficient on the interest-rate term (the interestrate “beta”) can be interpreted as measuring interest-rate exposure. Based on the
methodology developed by Flannery and James (1984), Hirtle (1997) extended the
specification by regressing interest-rate betas on a variable that reflects the scope of
BHCs’ participation in the interest-rate derivative market in a second-stage regression.
The interest-rate risk measures derived from the first-stage regression can be viewed as
the “output” of banks’ attempts to manage their interest-rate risk exposure, using the
“inputs” of balance-sheet positions and interest-rate derivatives.
A two-stage procedure is employed in this essay. Following Flannery and James
(1984), I first estimate the market-model regression to capture the measures of interestrate sensitivity (the interest-rate “beta”). Then these interest-rate betas are regressed on a
series of variables that reflect the composition of the BHCs’ balance sheet and the scope
of their participation in the interest-rate derivative market.
Two-factor Model
The approach used is based on the methodology introduced by Flannery and
James (1984). Specifically, the following equation is used to measure interest-rate
sensitivity for each bank j :
R jt

=

fio j

+ P m jR m t

+ P ljR lt

+ &jt

(3)

Where
Rjt = the return of bank j ’s stock in week t.
Rmt = the return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio of common stock in week t.
RIt = the weekly holding period return on a constant-maturity one-year Treasury security.
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Since the holding period returns on bonds are negatively correlated with the
change in the level of interest rates, a positive value for /3,j implies that bank j ’s market
value declines when interest rates rise. Therefore, /?;/, the coefficient on the interest-rate
term, measures the sensitivity of the return on bank holding company (BHC) j ’s stock to
changes in interest rates while controlling for changes in the return on the market. In that
sense, P1} can be used to measure BHC j ’s interest-rate risk exposure. A positive interestrate beta implies that the value of the BHC’s equity tends to decrease when interest rates
rise, while a negative beta implies the opposite. As specified in Equation (3) above,
however, the interest-rate beta is only a partial measure of interest-rate risk exposure.
Changes in the interest-rate environment may also affect the return on the market and,
consequently, BHC equity values (Flannery and James, 1984).
In order to obtain a total measure of each BHC’s interest-rate risk exposure, the
market return variable, Rml, is decomposed into two portions by regressing it on a
constant and RIt. The residuals from this regression capture the portion of Rmt that is
uncorrelated with the interest-rate term Ru. By substituting these residuals for Rmt in the
market-model equation, the coefficient on Ra in the market model will reflect both the
direct influence of changes in interest rates on BHC equity values and the indirect
influences working through changes in the market rate of return (Flannery and James,
1984). Giliberto (1985) argues that such orthogonalization introduces a bias into the
coefficient estimate and standard error for the interest-rate risk variable. Using OLS, the
only unbiased estimator is for f3mj. Without a priori knowledge of the bias direction, one
cannot establish how the test of /?/; is affected. Therefore, the regular t-test is
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inappropriate for drawing inferences about interest-rate sensitivity. However, as Hirtle
(1997) shows, the bias is that the resulting coefficient is an estimate of the total derivative
of the return on the bank’s stock with respect to the interest-rate variable rather than the
partial derivative. The total derivative is the coefficient of interest, so the “bias”
introduced by the orthogonalization is both intentional and desired.
In this study, first-stage regressions are estimated annually between 1998 and
2003 for each bank whose stock traded publicly for at least 30 weeks in a given calendar
year. This process results in a separate interest-rate sensitivity beta for each bank for each
year that the bank is in the sample.
Second-stage Regression
In the second-stage equation, the interest-rate betas derived from the first-stage
regression are regressed on a series of variables that reflect the composition of the BHCs’
balance sheet and the scope of their participation in the interest-rate derivative market.
The second-stage estimation equation is as follows:
„

Pip =

_

« o+ Z

at°t +

p rShorty
io r i.

i ^ ,(uDe eriv3
rw .
TA }j‘

(r-^rh
+ «2
TA~)j‘ + a 2(

(4)

+ a 3(In tasst) + mJt
Pijt is the interest-rate beta of bank j ’s equity. Dt is a time-indicator variable. Short
(maturity-gap measurement) is the j th bank’s average net short position; it is defined as
the value of assets maturing or re-pricing within a year minus liabilities maturing or re
pricing within a year. TA is the j ,h bank’s total assets. Deriv is the j th bank’s notional
amount of interest-rate derivative instruments, tun is an error term. The intercept
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a 0captures the effects of interest-rate changes on assets and liabilities that mature or reprice in more than one year as well as the effects of other specification errors. 22
To test the hypothesis that off-balance-sheet derivative activities are negatively
associated with the interest-rate sensitivity of stock prices after controlling for onbalance-sheet exposure, a measure of interest-rate derivative instruments (Deriv) is
incorporated into regression (4). Balance-sheet and derivative data are collected from the
June Call Report for each bank for each year in the sample. (

Deriv

)jt is the/

u

bank’s

notional principal amount of interest-rate derivative contracts scaled by its total assets.
Further, the logarithm of BHC asset size is included to control for differences in
interest-rate risk exposure that might be caused by differences in the types of businesses
and customers at large and small banks. In addition, Demsetz and Strahan (1995, 1997)
point out that banks of different size may have different risk preferences. For example,
large banks may choose to pursue risk-increasing activities (such as commercial and
industrial lending) because they are equipped with greater diversification advantages as
compared to smaller banks. Secondly, large bank holding companies may have greater
access to markets and products (e.g., over-the-counter dealer activity, foreign deposits,
and geographically diversified subsidiaries). These operating advantages can significantly
change their interest-rate risk profiles as compared to their smaller counterparts. Finally,
previous research finds that size is an important determinant of a bank’s derivative

22

The exam ination o f the conditional num ber and variance o f inflation factors does not indicate a
problem w ith m ulticollinearity.
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activities.23 Thus, it is important to control for asset size in the regression to avoid the
possibility of a spurious relationship between derivative activity and other size-related
factors.

Empirical Results
The empirical results of this essay (Chapter 3) are presented in this section. Table
5 summarizes the descriptive statistics. Table 6 presents the market-model regression
results, and Table 7 reports the second-stage regression results. The economic
implications of these results are also discussed in this section.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 5 summarizes the sample from 1998 through 2003. During the sample
period, the average maturity-gap-to-asset ratio is a negative 23 percent; the average
notional value of interest-rate derivatives over assets is 50 percent. The mean return for
the bank holding companies in the sample is 3.70 percent, and the mean return for the
value-weighted CRSP is 1.8 percent. During the sample period, 23.08 percent of the
sample banks reported using interest-rate swaps, 12.04 percent reported using interestrate options, and 10.68 percent reported using interest-rate forwards. Only 3.19 percent of
the sample banks reported using interest-rate futures. Finally, approximately 1 percent of
the banks in the sample are members of ISDA.
Market-model Regression and
Interest-rate Sensitivity
The market-model regressions are estimated annually between 1998 and 2003 for
each BHC whose stock traded publicly for at least 30 weeks in a given year. Table 6

23

F or exam ple, Sinkey and C arter (1997), K im and K oppenhaver (1992), and G unther and Siems
(1996) find that size is an im portant determ inant o f a b an k ’s derivative activities.
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T able 5 Sum m ary Statistics for th e Full S a m p le a’b
V ariable

M nem onic

M ean

Standard
D eviation

Stock Return an d Interest-rate Indices
B H C ’s Stock R eturn
M arket Return
Interest-rate T erm

BH C R E T
V W R ET
TREAS01

0.0037
0.0018
0.0025

0.0448
0.0269
0.1002

Balance Sheet D ata
M aturity G ap S caled by B H C ’s Total A ssets
D erivative S caled by B H C ’s Total A ssets
L og T otal A ssets

A SH O R T
A D ER IV
LN TA SST

-0.2326
0.4985
20.0067

3.1738
3.1168
2.1729

Classification Variable
Swaps (0-Y es, 1-No)
Futures (0-Y es, 1-No)
Forw ards (0-Y es, 1-No)
O ptions (0-Y es, 1-No)
D erivatives D ealer (0-N o, 1-Yes)

D SW A P
D FU TU RES
D FO R W A R D
D O PTIO N
D EALER

0.2308
0.0319
0.1068
0.1204
0.0120

0.4686
0.1843
0.3390
0.3628
0.1082

a M eans and standard deviations for all variables used in the em pirical analyses. T he statistics are
com puted over the p eriod from 1998 through 2003.
b B H C R E T is a bank holding com pany’s w eekly stock returns, and V W R E T is the value-w eighted CRSP
w eekly returns. TREA S01 is the w eekly holding-period return on a constant-m aturity one-year Treasury
security. SH O RT (m aturity-gap m easurem ent) is assets that m ature or re-p rice w ithin a year m inus
liabilities that m ature or re-price w ithin a year. D E A L E R is a binary variable, w hich is equal to one if the
BH C is an ISD A m em ber, or zero otherwise.
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T able 6 A ggregate M arket-m odel A nnual R egressions, 1998 T hrough 2003

= P0 j + P„Am, + PljRl, + £j,

Intercept ( J3()j )

M arket R eturn (

)

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

-0.0029

-0.0033

0.0033

0.0068

0.0052

0.0019

(-7.24) ***

(-7.81) ***

(6.06) ***

(14.23) ***

(12.87) ***

(5.81) ***

0.8670

0.4676

0.3215

0.5242

0.7089

0.7204

(20.82) ***

(31.05) ***

(40.26) ***

(44.57) ***

0.481

-0.0908

0.475

(57.05) ***
Interest-rate T erm ( /3 jj )

R-squared
N um ber o f B ank H olding Com panies

(27.28)

0.2363

0.317

0.270

(2.97) ***

(1.85)*

(1.26)

0.2331
215

0.1669
204

0.1400
201

(4.07) ***

(-6.41) ***

(4.80) ***

0.1357

0.1736

0.1980

193

178

171

R = the w eekly return o f bank j ’s stock in w eek t.

R mt = the w eekly return on the CR SP value-w eighted portfolio o f com m on stock in w eek t.

R lt = the holding period return on a constant-m aturity one-year T reasury security.
Statistical significance is displayed by the use o f one (10% ), tw o (5% ), or three (1% ) stars.
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T able 7 U nivariate M ultiple R egression C oefficient E stim a te sa,b
Independent variables

R egression (1)

R egression ( 2 )

R egression (3)

-0.0072

A D E R IV

(-2.72) ***
L N T A SS T

-0.0039
(-0.55)

A SH O RTD 1

-0.0039
(-0.61)
- 0 .1 0 1 0
(-1.53)

ASHORTD2

0.0095
(3.59) ***

A SH O R T D 3

0.0049
(0.56)

ASHORTD4

0.0027
(0.75)

A SH O R T D 5

0.0076
(3.01)

ASHORTD6

0 .0 1 0 1 ***

(3.66)
0.0055
(0.62)
0.0028
(0.76)
0.0077
(3.04) ***

0.0062

0.0062

(1.82 ) *

(1 .8 7 )*

A D ERIV D 1

-0.0003
(-0.13)
-0.0048
(-0.62)
-0.0075
( - 1 .0 2 )
-0.0026
(-0.45)
-0.0041
(-0.50)
-0.0063
(-0.39)
-0.0094

A D E R IV D 2

(-1.04)
-0.0142

A D ER IV D 3

(-1.57)
A D E R IV D 4

-0.0029
(-0.35)

A D ER IV D 5

-0.0031
(-0.39)
0.0014

A D E R IV D 6

0.01

ASHORT

- 0 .0 1 0 1
(-4.29) ***

-0.0104
( . 4 .4 5 ) ***

O B S E R V A T IO N S

1186

1186

A D J R -SQ U A R E

0.0687

0.0706

1186
0.0866

a A ll regression equations contain tim e-period indicator variables. T -statistics (reported in parentheses) are calculated
using N ew ey-W est heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent errors. S tatistical significance is displayed by the
use o f one (10% ), tw o (5% ), o r th ree (1% ) stars. T he sam ple contains six years o f ob serv atio n s from 1998 through
2003. T he dependent variable for all regressions is the estim ates o f interest-rate betas from the first-stage regression.
b A D E R IV is m easured as the ratio o f notional am ount o f interest-rate derivatives to total assets. A S H O R T is m easured
as the ratio o f m aturity-gap variable to total assets. L N T O T A SS T is the log arith m o f a b a n k ’s total assets.
A S H O R T D 1, A SH O R T D 2, A S H O R T D 3, A S H O R T D 4, A SH O R T D 5, and A S H O R T D 6 are six interactions betw een
m aturity-gap m easurem ent and tim e-period indication variables. A D E R IV D 1, A D E R IV D 2, A D E R IV D 3, A D ER IV D 4,
A D E R IV D 5, and A D E R IV D 6 are six interaction term s betw een derivative activity m easurem ent and tim e-period
indication variable.
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presents the yearly analysis of the market-model regressions. The regression process
produces a separate interest-rate sensitivity beta for each bank holding company for each
year that the BHC is in the sample. The average of those individual betas is positive
(0.4013), suggesting that an increase in interest rates leads to a decrease in BHC equity
values. These regressions are representative of the results across the BHCs contained in
the sample for a given year. Consistent with the findings of Hirtle (1997), there is
considerable variation across years in both the coefficients on the market return and on
the interest-rate term. In five of the six sample years, the interest-rate beta from these
cross-sectional regressions is positive and differs significantly from zero.
Estimation Results of
Regression Model
Since banks’ use of derivatives increases during the sample period, a pooled
cross-sectional time-series regression is employed to incorporate this dynamic effect.
Specifically, I run a cross-sectional OLS regression with interest-rate betas as the
dependent variable and then report the time-series means of the parameter estimates and
their corresponding t-statistics. The t-values are computed using Newey-West
heteroskedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent errors. Using estimates of interest-rate
betas from the first-stage regressions as dependent variables, I utilize Equation (4) to
examine the impact of derivatives on bank holding companies’ stock return interest-rate
sensitivity. Table 7 reports the results of pooled cross-sectional time-series regression
results for the sample period 1998 through 2003.
Regression (1) of Table 7 serves as a base for examining the relationship between
a financial institution’s stock returns’ interest-rate sensitivity and the maturity
composition of on-balance-sheet assets and liabilities. Under the maturity-mismatch
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Short
hypothesis, the expected sign of the coefficient estimate on (------- ) is negative. The test
TA
results, consistent with Flannery and James (1984), find a significantly negative
relationship between the measure of bank stock interest-rate sensitivity and the bank’s net
short-asset position.
In Regression (2) of Table 7, the interest-rate betas are regressed not only on the
on-balance-sheet activities but also on the off-balance-sheet activities approximated by
the notional principal amount of interest-rate derivatives scaled by BHCs’ total assets
(ADERIV). The coefficient on ADERIV reflects the impact of derivative usage
conditional on adequately incorporating the remaining terms of the specification. In
Diamond’s (1984) model, banks are delegated monitors having a comparative advantage
in monitoring and enforcing loan contracts made with borrowers. Diamond shows that
derivative instruments allow banks to lessen their systematic exposure to changes in
interest rates. Thus, in his model, banks find it optimal to hedge all interest-rate risk using
interest-rate derivatives. If derivative instruments allow banks to reduce their interest-rate
risk exposure as predicted by Diamond’s (1984) model, one would expect negative
coefficient estimates on the ADERIV variable.
As discussed in an earlier section, the logarithm of BHC asset size is included to
control for differences in interest-rate risk exposure that might be caused by differences
in the types of businesses and customers at large and small banks. To control for the
effect of changes in the interest-rate environment across time on on-balance-sheet
activity, I also introduce five possible interactions between the maturity-gap
measurement and the time-indicator variables. Column (2) of Table 7 reports the
estimation results for the derivative-augmented regressions. First, the coefficient
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estimates on the maturity-gap variable is qualitatively similar to that in the base model.
Second, the ASHORT coefficient estimate remains statistically significant.
Regression (2) of Table 7 shows that the coefficient estimate on ADERIV is
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that banks using interest-rate derivatives,
on average, experience significantly lower interest-rate betas. In fact, when the data are
evaluated at the sample means, using the results from regression (2) of Table 7, it is
estimated that each 100 basis points increase in derivative usage results in a 35 basis
points reduction in banks’ stock return interest-rate sensitivity.24
Normally, financial economists use the total variance of a bank’s historical stock
returns (or its standard deviation) as a measure of overall volatility associated with the
asset risk of a firm. If interest-rate derivative instruments enable banks to lessen their
systematic exposure to changes in interest-rate risk, holding everything else equal, one
would expect the variance of stock return for a bank that uses derivatives to be less than
the variance of stock return for the same bank had it not used derivatives. Similarly, one
would expect that the capital level required for derivative users to be less than nonusers.
Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (2001) examine the major differences in the financial
characteristics of banking organizations that use derivatives relative to those that do not.
They indeed find that banking organizations that use derivatives to manage interest-rate
risk hold lower levels of (expensive) capital than do other institutions. This finding
implies that derivative usage allows banks to substitute inexpensive risk management for
expensive capital.

94

A s show n in regression (2) o f T able 3, the coefficient estim ate on A D E R IV is -0.0072. The
average A D ER IV is 0.4985. Therefore, w hen the data are evaluated at the sam ple m ean, every 100 basis
points increase in derivative usage results in a 35 basis points reduction in a b a n k ’s stock return interestrate sensitivity.
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To evaluate the economic significance of the results, I calculate the standard
deviations of banking holding companies’ stock returns in each sample year. The
standard deviations are then recalculated, assuming that these banking firms do not
engage in interest-rate derivative activities. As shown in Table 8, the standard deviations
of stock returns are consistently smaller for users than for nonusers. This result is in line
with the predictions of hedging theories in that derivative instruments allow banks to
lessen their systematic exposure to changes in interest rates.
Next, the annual average market value of the stocks for bank holding companies
is calculated, and this market value is used as the base to calculate the extra capital that a
banking firm in the sample needed each year to hedge against the interest-rate risk. (See
Table 8 for detailed calculations.) The results indicate that a bank holding company, on
average, would have to use $209.37 million of capital each year to shift the interest-rate
beta down by 35 basis points had it not used interest-rate derivatives to hedge against
interest-rate risk. This finding is inconsistent with Hirtle (1997).

Its economic

significance provides further evidence that increased use of derivatives is associated with
lower interest-rate sensitivity after controlling for on-balance-sheet exposure.
This negative relationship between derivative activity and bank stock return
interest-rate sensitivity is consistent with Diamond’s (1984) model of financial
intermediation. In that model, Diamond argues that interest-rate derivatives allow banks
to lessen their systematic exposure to changes in interest rates. Similar to the findings of

25

H irtle uses the tw o-factor m arket m odel and finds that for the typical b ank holding com pany,
increases in the use o f interest-rate derivatives corresponded to greater interest-rate risk exposure during a
sub-sam ple period (1991-1994).
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T able 8 R isk S ensitivity o f B H C Stock Return, 1998 T hrough 2003

Standard D eviation o f B H C Stock Return

1998

1999

W ith D erivative U sage

0.002306

0.00272

W ithout D erivative U sage

0.003169

0.00334

1998

1999

M ean o f M arket V alue o f Stock

762,264,000

812,641,000

2001

2002

2003

0.002348

0.00263

0.002756

0.002653

0.002837

0.00289

0.003137

0.003396

2000

2000

958,502,000

2001

988,005,000

2002

1,137,381,000

2003

1,167,870,000

For exam ple, extra capital needed by sam ple B H C s to hedge interest-rate risk in year 1998 = (0.003169/0.002306)*762,264,000-762,264,000 = $285.27 m illion.
Sim ilarly, the extra capital needed by sam ple B H C s to hedge interest-rate risk in all sam ple years is calculated. T he average extra capital for all sam ple years
(1998 through 2003) is $209.37 m illion.

Oft

-t^
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Brewer, Jackson, and Moser (1996), the results of this study suggest that bank holding
companies use derivatives to hedge interest-rate risk rather than to speculate.

Robustness Checks
Overall, the results in the previous section suggest that bank stock return interestrate sensitivity is negatively related to banks’ participation in the derivative market. As a
further check on the validity of the results, I introduce five interaction terms between the
measure of derivative activity and time-indicator variables in regression (3) of Table 7.
Adding these variables addresses the concern that the impact of the derivative activity on
bank holding companies’ stock return interest-rate sensitivity is driven by any particular
time period or interest environment.26 As shown in column (3) of Table 7, none of the
coefficient estimates on interaction terms is statistically significant, suggesting that the
variability of interest rates during the sample period does not cloud the significant
association between derivative activity and stock return interest-rate sensitivity.

97

Regressions (1), (2), and (3) in Table 7 are based on a two-stage procedure. In this
procedure, I first estimate the market model regression to capture the measures of
interest-rate sensitivity (the interest-rate “beta”). Then these interest-rate betas are
regressed on a series of variables that reflect the composition of the BHCs’ balance sheets
and the scope of their participation in the interest-rate derivative market. Balance sheet
and derivative data are collected from the June Call Report for each bank for each year in
the sample. As an alternative specification, I evaluate the following equation:

26

M onetary policy m ay shift over the business cycle, w hich m ay lead to a shift in the relationship
betw een bank holding com panies’ stock returns and derivative activity.
27

E quation (2) is also estim ated separately for each sam ple year; the results confirm the pooled
cross-sectional estim ation.
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t
Short
RJt = a 0 + ^ laDi + a , (---------- ) jt + a 2D eri v D u m m y /(+ a 3D eri v ln te r e s ty/
<=2
TA
+ a 4S h o rtI n te re s t7, +PmjRmt + fyR,, + mjt

(5)

Equation (5) incorporates the BHC’s stock return data, BHC’s quarterly balance
sheet data, and BHC’s quarterly interest-rate derivative data from 1998 through 2003.
The results of the pooled cross-sectional time-series regression are also robust to the
inclusion of the derivative-use indicator variable, which is a binary variable equaling one
if a bank engages in any interest-rate derivative activity, or zero otherwise. Specifically,
the interest-rate betas captured from the first-stage regression are regressed on a
derivative-use dummy variable (DERIVDUMMY), the maturity-gap variable, the
interactions

between

the

maturity-gap

variable

and

the

interest-rate

term

(SHORTINTEREST), and the interactions between the derivative-use dummy and the
interest-rate term (DERIVINTEREST).
As shown in Table 9, the coefficient estimates on DERIVINTEREST are negative
and statistically significant. By contrast, the coefficient estimates on the interest-rate term
are positive and statistically significant. A striking feature of this second robustness
check is that coefficient estimates on DERIVINTEREST and the interest-rate term
balance out, suggesting that derivative users’ stock returns are insensitive to changes in
interest rates, holding everything else equal.

Once again, this result suggests that

interest-rate derivatives allow banks to lessen their systematic exposure to changes in
interest rates, thereby increasing the potential for banks to better manage their interestrate risk exposure.

28

A jo in t hypothesis test indicates that the coefficient estim ates on D E R IV IN T E R E ST and the
interest-rate term net to zero.
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T able 9 U nivariate M ultiple R egression C oefficient E stim ates

Independent V ariables

ASHORT
D E R IV D U M M Y
D E R IV IN T E R E S T
S H O R T IIN T E R E ST
M ARKETRETURN
IN T E R E ST T E R M

O B S E R V A T IO N S
A D J R -SQ U A R E

b

R egression (4)

0.00002
(0.82)
0.0019
(0.97)
-0.1385
(-2.39) **
0.0049
(0.92)
0.8909
(16.11) ***
0.1370
(3.27) ***
2461
0.2116

a The m ultiple regression equation contains tim e-indicator variables. T -statistics (reported in parentheses)
are calculated using N ew ey-W est heteroscedasticity-and-autocorrelation-consistent errors. Statistical
significance is displayed by the use o f one (10% ), tw o (5% ), or three (1% ) stars. The sam ple contains six
years o f observations from 1998 through 2003. T he dependent variable is th e w eekly return o f bank j ’s
stock in w eek t.
b A SH O R T is m easured as the ratio o f m aturity-gap variable to total assets. M A R K E T R E T U R N is the
w eekly return on C R SP value-w eighted portfolio o f com m on stocks in w eek t. IN T E R E ST T E R M is the
w eekly holding period return on a constant-m aturity one-year T reasury security. D E R IV D U M M Y is a
binary variable equal to one if a bank engages in any interest-rate derivative activity, or zero otherw ise.
D E R IV IN T ER E ST is the interaction betw een the derivative-use dum m y variable and the interest-rate term.
S H O R TIN T ER E ST is the interaction betw een the m aturity-gap variable and the interest-rate term .
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
Commercial banks employ different methods, including the use of interest-rate
derivatives to manage interest-rate risk. The use of these derivative instruments by banks
has increased tremendously in the past decade, rising from notional amounts of $27.88
trillion at the end of December 1996 to $62.78 trillion at the end of December 2004. The
popularity of derivative usage is due to the fact that derivatives provide a relatively
inexpensive means for banks to change their interest-risk exposure. In theory, the
existence of an active derivative market should increase the potential for banks to move
toward their desired levels of interest risk. Alan Greenspan states that complex financial
instruments such as derivatives have contributed to the development of an efficient,
flexible, and resilient financial system. The potential of derivative instruments has been
widely recognized, and the question that has arisen in consequence is whether banks have
used derivatives primarily to reduce the risks arising from their other banking activities
(for hedging) or to achieve higher levels of interest-rate risk exposure (for speculation). If
they use derivatives for hedging, is there a significant association between derivative
activities and stock return interest-rate sensitivity? Using recent data that cover a full
business cycle, this chapter revisits these questions to ascertain if a statistically
significant relationship still exists between derivative activities and stock return interestrate sensitivity.
The major finding of this essay (Chapter 3) is that stock returns of a bank holding
company using derivatives are less sensitive to interest-rate changes, controlling for
balance-sheet composition and asset size. This finding is consistent with the results of an
earlier study by Schrand (1997), who studies a sample of publicly traded savings and loan
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associations (S&Ls) over a sample period from 1984 to 1988. In addition, the results in
this essay are statistically and economically significant. In fact, the sample results suggest
that a bank holding company, on average, would have to use $209.37 million of capital
each year to shift the interest-rate beta down by 35 basis points if it did not use interestrate derivatives to hedge against interest-rate risk. This result is consistent with
Diamond’s (1984) prediction in which a bank can use interest-rate derivatives to hedge
against interest-rate risk. Furthermore, the results presented in this essay (Chapter 3) also
suggest that the restrictive policies for banks’ derivative activities have consequences in
innovation promotion and more effective bank risk management. The possibility that the
use of interest-rate derivative instruments is associated with lower bank holding
companies’ stock return interest-rate sensitivity implies that restrictions on bank
participation in financial derivatives could prevent banks from managing interest-rate risk
more effectively.
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CHAPTER 4
DURATION OF CORPORATE
DEBT ISSUES
Introduction
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have attempted to investigate the
factors that firms consider when choosing the maturity of their debt issues. In this
chapter, the duration of debt issues is examined. Some questions about the determinants
of debt maturity may also be answered by examining firms’ duration choices. Duration
measures the number of years required to recover the true cost of a bond, considering the
present value of all coupon and principal payments received in the future. Debt maturity
focuses more on matching the cash flow generated from the chosen project to the life of
the project. Research comparing both approaches may discern whether firms focus on
duration or maturity. Hypotheses that have been offered to explain corporate debt
maturity are used to examine the firms’ duration choices to see if factors that influence
maturity choices also affect bond duration.
Using a sample of debt issues from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum
database, I document the determinants of the durations of 8,627 public, non-convertible
corporate debt instruments placed in U.S. markets between January 1, 1990 and
December 31, 2002. I examine how signaling and asymmetric information as well as
agency problems are related to bond duration.

60
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The primary finding is that firm quality, as measured by credit rating, is directly
related to bond duration. I also find evidence suggesting that bond duration is inversely
related to firm size. In addition, I find that regulated non-financial firms have longer bond
durations and that syndicated offerings have longer durations than non-syndicated
offerings.
This essay (Chapter 4) is organized as follows: The next section provides a
comprehensive examination of the theories surrounding debt maturity and bond duration,
including a set of testable hypotheses. A description of the data obtained for analysis is
provided, and the models and results are then presented. The conclusions of this essay are
presented in the final section of Chapter 4.

Theories and Hypotheses
Theories and hypotheses that have been offered to explain corporate debt maturity
are used to examine the firms’ duration choices to determine if factors that influence
maturity choices also affect bond duration. Specifically, I investigate how signaling and
asymmetric information as well as agency problems are related to bond duration.
Signaling and Asymmetric
Information
Flannery (1986) examines the maturity structure of a firm’s risky debt using a
model of uncertainty where debt serves as a signal of credit quality. The model indicates
that, given low costs for debt issuance, high-quality firms will issue short-term debt when
they expect to benefit from bondholder scrutiny during the refinancing process, while
low-quality firms issue long-term debt to avoid re-evaluation. On the other hand,
abnormally high refinancing costs will lead to a pooling equilibrium where both highquality and low-quality firms issue long-term debt.
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The risk of not being able to refund debt because of deterioration in financial or
economic conditions can motivate firms to lengthen the maturity of their debt. Sharpe
(1991) and Titman (1992) suggest that unfavorable news about a borrower may arrive on
the refinancing date, causing investors not to extend credit or to raise default premia on
new debt issues. Diamond (1991) refers to this refinancing risk as a liquidity risk in that
the borrower is forced into an inefficient liquidation because refinancing is unavailable.
Diamond (1991) builds on Flannery’s (1986) paper by suggesting that high-quality firms
indeed desire short-term debt but face the risk that refinancing may be unavailable,
forcing liquidation and loss of control. Thus, the optimal maturity structure is decided by
a trade-off between its preference for short-term debt based on an expected improvement
in credit rating and greater liquidity risk. While liquidity risks give some firms an
incentive to borrow long-term, they may not be able to do so because the rate of return
required to compensate investors for bearing long-term credit risks can induce firms to
take risky low-quality projects. According to Diamond (1991), there are two categories of
short-term borrowers: high-rated borrowers using short-term debt to take advantage of
the arrival of information and low-rated borrowers who are screened out of the long-term
debt market because lenders want to keep them on a “short leash.” Thus, long-term bonds
are issued by those firms having intermediate ratings.
Diamond (1993) develops an asymmetric-information model where debt seniority
is related to debt maturity. Assuming that credit ratings provide noisy signals for the
quality of a firm’s projects, lenders have two possible options: (1) liquidating bad
projects and denying the firm a chance to extract control rents, or (2) simply accepting a
promised payment at the end of the life of the project in return for forgiving the amount
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of currently due obligations. As a result, high-quality borrowers utilize short-term debt
since it can be refinanced as positive information is revealed. Alternatively, low-quality
borrowers have long-term debt in the hope that lenders will not want to liquidate.
However, in an effort to avoid identifying themselves as low-quality borrowers, they will
emulate the high-quality borrowers by issuing debt at both ends of the maturity spectrum.
I construct two empirical tests to measure the relationship between firm quality
and bond duration. First, I test Flannery’s (1986) separating equilibrium hypothesis by
comparing investment-grade issues with speculative-grade issues. In this case, the
signaling hypothesis suggests that investment-grade issues should have shorter durations
than speculative-grade issues. Alternatively, Diamond’s (1993) asymmetric information
model suggests no difference between bond-rating groups. Second, I test Diamond’s
(1991) hypothesis by comparing high- and low-rated issues to intermediate-rated issues.
Asymmetric information theory suggests that both high-rated and low-rated issues should
have shorter durations than intermediate-rated issues since low-quality firms are screened
out of the long-term debt market. Even though credit-rating information is publicly
available, it is used to test the asymmetric information hypothesis since firms with a low
credit rating are more susceptible to information asymmetry problems than are firms with
a high credit rating. As a result, firms with a low credit rating are more likely to issue
short-term debt due to the larger information costs associated with long-term debt.
Agency Problems
Myers (1977) analyzes possible externalities generated by debt on shareholders’
(and management’s) optimal investment strategies. According to Myers (1977), in some
cases, the benefits from undertaking profitable investment projects are split between
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stockholders and bondholders. If debt matures after the expiration of the firm’s
investment option, profits from investment will accrue, at least partially, to the
bondholders rather than accrue fully to the shareholders. As a result, a shareholder and
manager coalition will be reluctant to pursue future investment. Myers calls this the
underinvestment problem. Myers (1977) predicts that debt maturity after the expiration of
the growth option causes an underinvestment problem. High-growth opportunity firms
are more likely to face an underinvestment problem compared with low-growth
opportunity firms. The implication of the Myers (1977) paper is that firms with a history
of underinvestment and a large number of growth opportunities should attempt to control
underinvestment by including less debt in their capital structure, placing restrictive
covenants on debt issues, or shortening the maturity of debt issues. Empirically, Barclay
and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Highfield
(2005) all find that firms with more growth options have shorter-term debt, supporting
the idea that short-term debt is employed to reduce agency problems. Applying this line
of logic to bond duration, one would expect high-growth firms to have shorter bond
duration.
Because small firms typically have more growth opportunities, along with greater
business risk, they are more susceptible to agency problems than their larger counterparts.
Thus, small firms in riskier businesses attempt to lower agency costs by issuing short
term debt. Although several authors (e.g., Mitchell, 1991; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Stohs
and Mauer, 1996; and Ooi, 1999) find a positive relationship between debt maturity and
firm size, Carey, Prowse, Rhea, and Udell (1993) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001) find that
firm size is inversely related to debt maturity. Alternatively, Guedes and Opler (1996)
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find that large firms issue at both ends of the maturity spectrum, while small firms tend to
issue long-term debt. Based on this line of reasoning, one would expect larger firms to
have longer bond duration.
While some firms struggle with agency problems and benefit from the selfimposed discipline of short-term debt, other firms such as utilities and financial
institutions are monitored by government and industry regulators. Using an agencyproblem framework, Smith (1986) and Barclay and Smith (1995) suggest that regulations
reduce managerial discretion and effectively control underinvestment, risk shifting, and
asset-substitution problems. Citing fewer growth opportunities, Smith (1986), Smith and
Watts (1992), Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Kirshnaswami,
Spindit, and Subramaniam (1999), and Highfield (2005) find that regulated firms issue
long-term debt. Applying this line of logic to bond duration, one would expect to find
that regulated firms have longer bond duration.
Finally, Raj an (1992) suggests that short-maturity loans provide opportunities for
lenders to extract rents from borrowers at the time of loan renewal or to subject the
borrower to a hold-up problem. In the case of syndication, any rents would have to be
shared with other members of the syndicate; therefore, since the lead bank incurs
additional costs from the monitoring activities necessary to convince other banks to join
the syndicate, rent extraction becomes less profitable. Long-term loans lower the overall
cost of monitoring by allowing these costs to be amortized over time, making the loan
more profitable for the lead bank in the syndicate. Additionally, short-maturity loans also
come with more frequent renewals that increase the amount of monitoring necessary to
convince other banks to join the syndicate. Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) find that loan
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syndication is directly related to loan maturity; therefore, extending this concept to the
bond market, on average, one would expect syndicated bond issues to have longer
durations than their non-syndicated counterparts.
In this essay, I construct four empirical tests for the relationship between agency
problems and bond duration. First, I test Myers’ (1977) theory that high-growth firms
have shorter bond duration in an effort to control agency problems. Second, similar to
Barclay and Smith (1995) and Stohs and Mauer (1996), I test for a direct relationship
between firm size and bond duration since small firms have more growth opportunities
and should use short-term debt to control agency problems. Third, consistent with Smith
(1986) and Barclay and Smith (1995), I test the proposition that regulated firms have
longer bond duration. Finally, since syndicated loans are effectively a hybrid of public
and private debt, comparable to Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) and Highfield (2005), I
test the hypothesis that syndicated bond offerings have longer duration than non
syndicated offerings.
Data Source
The sample for this essay (Chapter 4) includes 8,627 public, non-convertible
corporate debt instruments issued between January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2002. Issue
information comes from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum U.S. Corporate New
Issues database (SDC). Bank debt and commercial paper are not included in the SDC
database. The SDC database is limited to public debt offerings with a maturity of at least
one year (defined as 360 days). In addition, I eliminated observations where the issuing
firm did not have an S&P rating at the time of issuance.
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Table 10 presents sample summary statistics. The bonds in the sample range in
duration from 0.97 years to over 99.99 years, and the mean duration is 6.10 years. The
bonds in the sample range in maturity from 1 year to a little over 101 years, and the mean
maturity is about 9.75 years. Approximately 31 percent of the sample has an S&P A
rating or above, 2 percent has an S&P B rating or below, and 67 percent falls into the
S&P middle-rate range. Approximately 94 percent of the sample has an S&P rating in the
investment-grade range, and 6 percent falls into the S&P high-yield range. About 40
percent of the bond issues are syndicated. Of those, the average coupon rate is just over
6.78 percent, and the average firm in the sample has a total market capitalization of $9
billion.
Table 11 shows the distribution of debt issues in the sample by year of issue.
Corresponding to the low interest-rate environment of the late 1990s, the heaviest volume
of new issues in the sample was in 1997 and 1998. As shown in panel A of Table 11, the
mean duration over the sample period is 6.10 years, ranging from an average duration of
4.05 years in 2000 to 7.50 years in 1993. Panel B of Table 11 shows the mean maturity
for the sample, which is 9.75 years. Overall, the mean maturity for the sample ranges
from an average maturity of 5.71 years in 2000 to 12.22 years in 1991. As a general rule,
(1) bonds paying interest prior to maturity will have durations less than their maturity,
and (2) the larger the coupon, the shorter the duration. Table 11 indicates that the mean
duration is less than the mean maturity for the sample.
Table 12 presents the distribution of debt issues by duration across bond ratings.
As one would expect for new bond issues, the sample contains relatively few high-yield
rated bonds as compared to the number of investment-grade bonds. In fact, the sample
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T able 10 Sam ple D escriptive Statistics
The sample contains 8,627 debt instrum ents issued p laced in U.S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and
D ecem ber 31, 2002. The descriptive statistics o f the sam ple are presented below.
V A RIA BLE
Coupon
D uration
M aturity
L og (M aturity)
M arket-to-book
Regulate
Log (Total Cap)
D Eratio
SYN D ICA TE
M ultiple
Financial
H IG H TECH
S&P Rating A A A
S&P R ating A A
S&P R ating A
S&P R ating B B B
S&P R ating BB
S&P R ating B
S&P R ating CCC
S&P H ighrate
S&P M idrate
S&P Low rate

MEAN

STD D EV

M IN IM U M

8627
8627

6.779
6.097

1.506
3.734

0.000
0.973

8627
8627

9.751
1.857

9.937
0.974

1.000
0.000

8627

1.073

8627
8627

0.685
22.919

3.167
0.464
1.771

0.995
0.000
14.224

264.285
1.000
28.360

8627

9.187
0.401
0.289

177.180

0.000
0.000

99.000
1.000
1.000

N

8627
8627
8627

0.504

4937
8627
8627
8627

0.163
0.045

8627
8627
8627
8627

0.285
0.034

8627
8627
8627

0.490
0.453
0.500

0.000
0.000

M A X IM U M
17.000
99.990
101.464
4.619

1.000

0.000
0.000

1.000
1.000

0.000
0.000

1.000
1.000

0.451

0.000

1.000

0.020
0.001

0.182
0.140
0.044

0.000
0.000

1.000
1.000

0.000

1.000

0.657
0.320
0.022

0.474
0.466
0.147

0.000
0.000
0.000

1.000
1.000
1.000

0.162
0.450

0.369
0.207
0.368
0.497
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Table 11 Time Distribution o f Debt Issues
The sam ple contains 8,627 d ebt instrum ents placed in U .S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and D ecem ber
31, 2002. The to tal num ber o f issues per year and the m ean duration o f the issues placed each year are
presented below.

Panel A: Time D istribution o f D eb t Issues Duration

Y ear o f Issuance
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

T otal

Total N um ber o f Issues

M ean D uration in Y ears
6.27
6.71

145
248
414
536
404
625
980
1291
1395
872
654
973
90
8627

6 .8 6

7.50
5.97
6.38
5.65
6.33
7.16
5.58
4.05
5.18
5.67
6 .1 0

P anel B: Time D istribution o f D ebt Issues M aturity

Y ear o f Issuance

Total N um ber o f Issues

1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999

145
248
414
536
404
625
980
1291
1395
872
654
973
90
8627

2000
2001
2002

T otal

M ean M aturity in Y ears
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11.91
1 2 .2 2

10.80
1 1 .6 6
8 .8 8

10.28
9.06
10.81
12.15
8.30
5.71
9.33
8.14
9.75
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Table 12 Distribution of Debt Issues by Duration Across S&P Bond Ratings
The sam ple contains 8,627 debt instrum ents p laced in U.S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and D ecem ber
31, 2002. This table show s the distribution o f the d eb t issues by S& P bond rating an d term to duration. The
m ean and standard deviation o f bond duration for each rating class are also presented.

S & P B o n d R a tin g

D uration

AAA

AA

A

BBB

BB

X <2
<X < 5
< X <7
< X < 10
<X <20
< X < 30
<X

101

619
233
294
138

612
1068
483
1209
507

173
626
438
876
352

3
78
125
72
18

0

1

2

1

1

4

3

1

Total

389

1399

3884

2467

M ean D uration

7.79

4.58

6.09

Std. Dev.

5.24

4.08

5.24

2
5
7
10

20
30

47
26
54
160

110

B

CCC

T otal

0

0

22

0

100

10

49
3

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

1508
2074
1292
2561
1178
5
9

297

174

17

8627

6.67

6.13

6.39

6.67

6 .1 0

3.59

2.30

1.42

1.19

3.73
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does not contain any observations with CC, C, or D ratings. In this sample, 56 percent of
the issues has a duration under 7 years; 15 percent of the sample has a duration between 7
and 10 years; and 29 percent has a duration of 10 years or greater. O f bonds with an S&P
rating of A or higher, 47 percent has a duration of 5 years or less, and only 1 percent has
a duration of 20 years or greater. Thus, over 52 percent of the sample having a high S&P
rating has a duration between 5 and 20 years. Conversely, of bond issues with an S&P
rating of BBB or lower, 15 percent has a duration of 5 years or less, and 13 percent has a
duration of 20 years or greater. Thus, about 72 percent of the sample with an S&P rating
of BBB or lower has a duration of 5 to 20 years. As a check, I regress the duration on
S&P investment-grade credit ratings and S&P speculative-grade credit ratings. At the
same time, I limit the durations to 20 years or less, since 99 percent of the observations
has a duration of less than 20 years. As shown in Table 13, the issues with investmentgrade ratings tend to have longer durations than their high-yield counterparts.
Table 14 presents the distribution of debt issues by maturity across S&P bond
ratings. There are 43 percent of the issues having a maturity under 7 years; 11 percent of
the sample has a maturity between 7 and 10 years; and 46 percent has a maturity of 10
years or greater. Table 14 shows that, in general, as bond ratings decline, the mean term
to maturity declines.
Of the 5,672 bonds with an S&P rating of A or higher, 1,906 (34 percent) have
maturities of less than 5 years, and 768 (14 percent) have maturities of 20 years or greater.
Thus, approximately 53 percent of the sample with a high S&P rating falls in the maturity
range of 5 to 20 years. Conversely, of the 2,955 bond issues with an S&P rating of BBB
or lower, only 452 (15 percent) have maturities of less than 5 years, and 387 (13 percent)
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Table 13 Distribution of Debt Issues by Duration Across S&P Bond Ratings (Regression Results)
The sam ple contains 8,627 debt instrum ents p laced in U.S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and D ecem ber
31, 2002. The dependent variable for all regressions is bond duration. S& P A A A is a binary variable equal
to one for bonds issued by firm s w ith S tandard and P o o r’s A A A credit rating at the tim e o f issuance, zero
otherw ise. S&P A A is a binary variable equal to one for bonds issued by firm s w ith Standard and P o o r’s
A A credit rating at the tim e o f issuance, zero otherw ise. S& P A is a binary variable equal to one for bonds
issued by firm s w ith S tandard and P o o r’s A credit rating at the tim e o f issuance, zero otherwise. S& P BBB
is a binary variable equal to one for bonds issued by firm s w ith Standard and P o o r’s BBB credit rating at
the tim e o f issuance, zero otherw ise. S& P BB is a binary variable equal to one for bonds issued by firm s
w ith Standard and P o o r’s BB credit rating at the tim e o f issuance, zero otherw ise. S&P B is a binary
variable equal to one for bonds issued by firm s w ith Standard and P o o r’s B cred it rating at the tim e o f
issuance, zero otherw ise. S& P CCC is a binary variable equal to one for bonds issued by firm s w ith
Standard and P o o r’s CC C credit rating at the tim e o f issuance, zero otherw ise. The t-statistics for each
coefficient reported in parentheses are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors
(HCSEs), and statistical significance is displayed by the use o f one (10% ), tw o (5 % ), and three (1% ) stars.

INTERCEPT
S&P AAA
S&P AA
S&P A
S&P BBB

Investm ent-grade

Speculative-grade

R egression

R egression

6.05
(5.61)

6 .2 0 ***
(8 .1 0 )
1.52***
(6.58)
1.71***
(9.51)
-0.14
(-0.85)
0.42**
(2.49)

S&P BB

0 .0 2

(0 . 1 0 )
0.35
(1.30)
0.63
(0.74)

S&P B
S&P CCC

R-SQUARE

0.0502

0.0301

ADJ R-SQUARE

0.0497

0.0219

OBSERVATIONS

8627

8627
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Table 14 Distribution of Debt Issues by Maturity Across S&P Bond Ratings
The sample contains 8,627 debt instrum ents p laced in U .S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and D ecem ber
31, 2002. This table show s th e distribution o f the d eb t issues by S& P b o n d rating and term to maturity. The
m ean and standard deviation o f term to m aturity for each rating class are also presented.

S & P B o n d R a tin g

T erm to
M aturity

AAA

AA

A

BB B

83
38
35
18
61
49
105

563
175
127
77
329
41
87

437
610
727
371
1253
185
301

60
355
422
339
924

389

1399

M ean Term to
M aturity

15.19

Std. Dev.

13.84

2
5
7
10
20
30

X <2
<X <5
<X <7
< X < 10
< X <20
< X < 30
<X

Total

BB

B

CCC

T otal

1

0

0

0

1145
1213
1387
953
2774
412
743

297

174

17

8627

10.83

8.78

8.87

8.65

9.75

10.30

4.97

2.40

1 .8 8

9.94

2

0

0

4
19
57
93

0

245

31
55
84
106
14
5

3884

2467

7.23

9.54

10.07

9.38

122

2

7
8
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have maturities of 20 years or greater. Thus, approximately 72 percent of the sample with
an S&P rating of BBB or lower falls in the maturity range of 5 to 20 years. The
distribution of debt issues by maturity across bond ratings shown in Table 14 confirms
the results shown in Table 12.

Methods and Results
I calculate the duration as follows:
1C

2C

nC

nM

Macaulay Duration = 1+ >^ (l + y ) ----------(l ±Z 2 L J h l L

(6)

Where
P - price of the bond
C = semiannual coupon interest (in dollars)

y = one-half the yield to maturity or required yield
n = number of semiannual periods (number of years x 2)
M = maturity value (in dollars)
Using the duration of the bond issue as the dependent variable, the following
specifications of bond issue duration are estimated:
DURATION = /30 + P^S&P INVEST + /3 2MV/BVi + /? 3REGULATE.
+ /3^LN(TOTALCAP)i + / 3sSYNDICATEj + CONTROL VARIABLES + Ej

DURATION = /? 0 + P^S&P HIGHRATE.+P2S&P L O W R A T E ^ ^M V /B V + P^REGULATE:f
+ P sLN(TOTALCAP)t + P 6SYNDICATEj + CONTROL VARIABLES + S j
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The control variables include a binary variable for multiple issues by the same
firm and the total-debt-to-equity ratio (Debt/Equity).29 The t-values are computed using
White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (HCSEs).
Signaling and Asymmetric
Information
Equation (8) allows me to test Flannery’s (1986) separating equilibrium
hypothesis. I compare investment-grade issues to speculative-grade issues by including a
binary variable. S&P INVEST denotes bonds issued by firms with S&P investment-grade
credit ratings at the time of issuance. Table 15 presents the regression model coefficient
estimates. Column (1) reports the full regression estimates, column (2) reports the
estimation excluding financial firms, and column (3) reports the estimation for financial
firms only.30
The signaling hypothesis is confirmed if investment-grade issues have shorter
durations than speculative-grade issues, but Diamond’s (1993) asymmetric information
model suggests no difference between the bond rating groups. Unlike Stohs and Mauer
(1996), I do not find evidence supporting Flannery’s (1986) signaling hypothesis. In
addition, the empirical results in this chapter do not support Diamond’s (1993)
asymmetric information model that there is no difference between investment-grade
issues and speculative-grade issues. Instead, the results of this study suggest that
investment-grade firms issue debt with a longer duration than their high-yield
counterparts, on average.
29

The F -test show n in Table 15 fails to reject the hypothesis th a t the coefficient estim ates on
M V /BV, D ebt/E quity, and LN TO T A L C A P are jo in tly zero.
30

A n exam ination o f the conditional num ber and variance o f inflation factors does not indicate a
problem w ith m ulticollinearity.
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Table 15 Regression Models
The sam ple contains 8,627 debt instrum ents p laced in U .S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and D ecem ber
31, 2002. The dependent variable for all regressions is bond duration. S& P IN V E S T is a binary variable
equal to one for bonds issued by firm s w ith S tandard and P o o r’s investm ent-grade credit rating at the tim e
o f issuance, or zero otherw ise. SY N D IC A TE is a binary variable for bond issues th at are syndicated.
L N TO TA LC A P is the natural logarithm o f the total capitalization o f the issuing firm. (M V /BV ) is the
issuing firm ’s m arket-to-book ratio. The control variables (not presented) include (D ebt/Equity), the totaldebt-to-equity ratio, and M U L T IP L E , a binary variable for m ultiple issues by the sam e firm . The t-statistics
for each coefficient reported in parentheses are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard
errors (H C SEs), and statistical significance is displayed by the use o f one (10% ), tw o (5 % ), and three (1% )
stars.

F inancial Issues

A ll Issues

N on-financial Issues

12.78—
(24.00)
0.65***
(3.79)
-0.07
(-0.64)
-0.93*”
(-10.64)
-0.32"**
(-13.54)
0 .0 2 ”
(2.23)
1.57***
(19.73)
0.14*
( 1 .6 8 )

(12.56)
1.14” *
(6.72)
0.08
(0.03)
0.28” *
(2.81)
- 0 .2 2 ***
(-5.66)
0 .0 1 *
(1.95)
1 .0 0 ***
( 1 0 .11)
-0.43*”
(-4.02)

-0.14*”
(-4.30)
0.05
(1.04)
1.74***
(13.40)
0.42**"
(3.22)

R-SQUARE

0.1039

0.0447

0.0506

ADJ R-SQUARE

0.1031

0.0431

0.0491

62.20***

11.72*”

6.45***

INTERCEPT
S&P INVEST
MV/BV
REGULATE
LNTOTOTALCAP
DERATIO
SYNDICATE
MULTIPLE

10.81***

8.18“ *
(9.60)
-0.45
( - 1 .0 1 )
-0.08
(-0.58)

H0: (MV/BV) = (Debt/Equity) =
LNTOTALCAP= 0
OBSERVATIONS

8627

4274
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Equation (9) allows me to specifically examine Diamond’s (1991) hypothesis that
there is a nonmonotonic structure in credit ratings. I compare high-rated and low-rated
issues to intermediate-rated issues by including two binary variables. S&P HIGHRATE is
a binary variable for bonds issued by firms rated as AAA, AA, or A by S&P at the time
of issuance. S&P LOWRATE is a binary variable for bonds issued by firms rated as B,
CCC, or D by S&P at the time of issuance. These results are shown in Table 16.
I find that high-rated firms tend to issue debt with longer durations than middle
rated companies. The coefficient for low-rated firms is not statistically significant except
for the issues restricted to non-financial firms. This direct relationship between credit
ratings and duration is inconsistent with Diamond’s (1991) hypothesis that there is a
nonmonotonic structure in credit ratings, and it is also inconsistent with Diamond’s (1993)
asymmetric information model that low-quality issuers attempt to emulate high-quality
issuers.
Agency Problems
Four empirical tests are constructed in this essay (Chapter 4) to evaluate the
relationship between agency problems and bond duration. First, a growth measure, the
issuing firm’s market-to-book ratio (MV/BV), is used to test Myers’ (1977) theory that
firms with high growth opportunities have shorter bond duration in an effort to control
agency problems. Inconsistent with Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996),
Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Highfield (2005), I find that all coefficient estimates for
MV/BV are statistically insignificant.
Since small firms have more growth opportunities and should issue short-term
debt to control agency problems, in the second empirical test regarding agency problems,
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Table 16 Regression Models
The sam ple contains 8,627 debt instrum ents placed in U.S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and D ecem ber
31, 2002. T he dependent variable for all regressions is b o n d duration. S& P H IG H R A T E is a binary variable
for bonds issued by firm s rated as A A A , AA, or A b y S&P at the tim e o f issuance. S& P LO W R A TE is a
binary variable for bonds issued by firm s rated as B, CC C, D by S& P at the tim e o f issuance. SY N D IC A TE
is a binary variable for bond issues that are syndicated. L N T O T A L C A P is the natural logarithm o f the total
capitalization o f the issuing firm. (M V /B V ) is the issuing firm ’s m arket-to-book ratio. The control
variables (not presented) include (D ebt/E quity), the total-debt-to-equity ratio, and M U LTIPLE, a binary
variable for m ultiple issues by the sam e firm. The t-statistics for each coefficient reported in parentheses
are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (H C SE s), and statistical significance is
displayed by the use o f one (10% ), tw o (5 % ), and three (1% ) stars.

A ll Issues

N o n -F in an cial Issues

F inancial Issues

7.44*"
(8.59)
-0.19
(-1.1 0 )
0.16
( 0 .2 0 )
-0 . 0 2
(-0.58)

13.66***
24.11)
0.27*“
(2.99)
-0.36
(-1.30)
-0.08
(- 0 .6 6 )
-0.94*“
(-10.73)
-0.34***
(-13.26)
0 .0 1 “
( 2 .2 0 )
1.61 —
(19.68)
0.15 *
(1.78)

11.93***
(13.22)
0.59***
(5.83)
-0.53*
(-1.94)
-0 . 0 1
(- 0 .0 1 )
0 .2 5 ”
(2.55)
-0.24*”
(-5.92)
0 .0 2 *
(1.87)
1.07"*
(10.59)
-0.42***
(-3.90)

-0 . 1 2 “ *
(-3.20)
0.05
(1.05)
1.73*”
(3.11)
0.41” *
(3.11)

R-SQUARE

0.1036

0.0441

0.0507

ADJ R-SQUARE

0.1027

0.0423

0.0489

59.78” *

12.64***

3.74***

INTERCEPT
S&P HIGHRATE
S&P LOWRATE
MV/BV
REGULATE
LNTOTOTALCAP
DERATIO
SYNDICATE
MULTIPLE

H„: (MV/BV) = (Debt/Equity)
= LNTOTALCAP= 0
OBSERVATIONS

8627

4274
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I test for a direct relationship between firm size and duration using the natural logarithm
of the total capitalization of the issuing firm (LNTOTALCAP). Consistent with Carey et
al. (1993) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001), I find that bond duration is inversely related to
firm size, a finding inconsistent with Myers’ (1977) hypothesis that small firms use short
term debt to control agency problems.
The hypothesis that regulated firms have long-term debt is also tested by using a
binary variable for regulated firms (REGULATE). Inconsistent with Smith (1986) and
Barclay and Smith (1995), the findings in the third test regarding agency problems
indicate that regulated firms have shorter duration, with one exception: non-financial
institutions. Once the sample is restricted to non-fmancial firms, the results indicate that
regulated firms tend to issue debt with longer durations than non-regulated firms, a
finding consistent with the hypothesis that government regulation can effectively control
agency problems such as underinvestment, risk shifting, and asset substitution. As an
alternative specification, I also test the hypothesis that regulated firms have longer
durations by introducing an interaction term (INTERACTION) between REGULATE
and FINANCIAL (a binary variable for financial firms). As shown in Tables 17 and 18,
coefficient estimates on INTERACTION are negative and statistically significant,
suggesting that regulated financial firms have shorter durations.
A binary variable for syndicated issues (SYNDICATE) is used to test the
hypothesis that syndicated offerings have longer durations. Supporting Dennis and
Mullineaux (1999) and Highfield (2005), regardless of sample selection, the fourth test
regarding agency problems indicates that syndicated offerings have longer durations than
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Table 17 Regression Models
The sam ple contains 8,627 debt instrum ents p laced in U.S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and D ecem ber
3 1 ,2 0 0 2 . The dependent variable for all regressions is b o n d duration. S& P H IG H R A T E is a binary variable
for bonds issued b y firm s rated as A A A , AA, or A by S& P at the tim e o f issuance. S& P LO W R A TE is a
binary variable for bonds issued b y firm s rated as B, CCC, and D by S& P at the tim e o f issuance.
SY N D IC A TE is a binary variable for b o n d issues that are syndicated. L N T O T A L C A P is the natural
logarithm o f the to tal capitalization o f the issuing firm . (M V /B V ) is the issuing firm ’s m arket-to-book
ratio. The control variables (not presented) include (D ebt/E quity), th e total-debt-to-equity ratio, and
M U LTIPLE, a binary variable for m ultiple issues by the sam e firm. IN T E R A C T IO N is the interaction term
betw een R E G U L A T E and F IN A N C IA L binary variables. The t-statistics for each coefficient reported in
parentheses are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (H C SE s), and statistical
significance is displayed by the use o f one (10% ), tw o (5% ), and three (1% ) stars.

A ll Issues

INTERCEPT
S&P INVEST
MV/BV
INTERACTION
LNTOTOTALCAP
DERATIO
SYNDICATE
MULTIPLE

9 .88“ "
(19.81)
0.85"**
(5.49)
-0.07
(-0.65)
-1.76***
(-11.04)
-0.28***
(-8.27)
0 . 0 1 **
(2.46)
1 39***
(18.90)
0 .0 2

(0.36)

R-SQUARE

0.1570

ADJ R-SQUARE

0.1563

H0: (MV/BV) =(Debt/Equity) = LNTOTALCAP = 0
OBSERVATIONS

62.20***
8627
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Table 18 Regression Models
The sam ple contains 8,627 debt instrum ents placed in U .S. m arkets betw een January 1, 1990 and D ecem ber
3 1 ,2 0 0 2 . T he dependent variable for all regressions is b o n d duration. S& P H IG H R A T E is a binary variable
for bonds issued by firm s rated as A A A , AA, or A by S& P at the tim e o f issuance. S& P LO W RA TE is a
binary variable for bonds issued by firm s rated as B, CCC, and D b y S& P at the tim e o f issuance.
SY N D IC A TE is a binary variable for bond issues that are syndicated. L N T O T A L C A P is the natural
logarithm o f the total capitalization o f the issuing firm . (M V /B V ) is the issuing firm ’s m arket-to-book
ratio. The control variables (not presented) include (D ebt/E quity), th e total-debt-to-equity ratio, and
M U LTIPLE, a binary variable for m ultiple issues by the same firm. IN T E R A C T IO N is the interaction term
betw een R E G U L A T E and F IN A N C IA L binary variables. T he t-statistics for each coefficient reported in
parentheses are calculated using heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors (H C SEs), and statistical
significance is displayed by the use o f one (10% ), tw o (5% ), and three (1% ) stars.

All Issues

INTERCEPT
S&P HIGHRATE
S&P LOWRATE
MV/BV
INTERACTION
LNTOTOTALCAP
DERATIO
SYNDICATE
MULTIPLE

10.98***
(20.73)
0.28***
(3.99)
-0.34
( - 1 .0 1 )
-0.07
(-0.70)
-1.76***
(-11.70)
-0.24***
(-8.71)
0 .0 1 **
(2.40)
1 4 4 ***
(19.24)
0.19*
(0.63)
0.1564

R-SQUARE

0.1556
ADJ R-SQUARE

59.78***
H0: (MV/BV) = (Debt/Equity) = LNTOTALCAP = 0

8627
OBSERVATIONS
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their non-syndicated counterparts. As shown in Tables 15 and 16, all coefficients for
SYNDICATE are statistically significant. This finding is consistent with the proposition
that long-term loans help control agency problems associated with bank monitoring and
rent extraction.

Comparison of Duration and Maturity
Empirical Findings
In the previous sections, I use the hypotheses that have been offered to test
corporate debt maturity to examine firms’ duration choices to determine if factors that
influence firms’ debt-maturity decisions also affect duration choices. Most of the results
in this chapter support the findings of previous empirical work that examines the
determinants of debt maturity except for two major hypotheses. Stohs and Mauer (1996)
support the signaling hypothesis by Flannery (1986) and find that investment-grade
issues have shorter maturity than speculative-grade issues. They also find strong support
for the prediction of a nonmonotonic relationship between debt maturity and bond rating;
firms with high or very low bond ratings use short-term debt. In contrast, I find that
investment-grade firms issue debt having longer durations than their high-yield
counterparts. I also find a direct relationship between bond duration and firm quality as
measured by credit ratings. One possible reason for this finding is that high-quality firms
are able to pay lower coupons because of their high credit ratings. As a result, their debts
have longer durations than debt issued by low-quality firms. Similarly, low-quality firms
are forced to issue short-term debt and to pay higher coupons because of their poor credit
ratings. As a consequence, their debts have shorter durations than debt issued by their
high-quality counterparts.
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Conclusions
Much theoretical and empirical research focuses on the determinants of debt
maturity. In this chapter, departure is made from earlier studies by examining the
duration of debt issues. As an exploratory investigation, this chapter searches for
potential linkages between the various theories and empirical findings from the previous
literature on debt maturity and bond duration. I examine a sample of 8,627 debt issues
from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database to identify the important factors in
determining the length of duration of public, non-convertible debt. I use Macaulay’s
Duration as the dependent variable to test theoretical hypotheses where bond duration is
influenced by signaling and asymmetric information as well as agency problems.
My study finds no support for the signaling hypothesis, nor does it find support
for the theory of a nonmonotonic structure in credit ratings where firms with very high
and very low credit ratings have shorter durations, while firms with intermediate credit
ratings have longer durations. Instead, I find a direct relationship between bond duration
and firm quality as measured by credit ratings. This evidence is in line with Diamond’s
(1991) hypothesis that risky firms are screened out of the long-term debt market.
For agency problems, the issuing firm’s market-to-book ratio is used as a growth
measure to test Myers’ (1977) theory; however, no support is found in this essay for the
hypothesis that high-growth firms have shorter duration. Alternatively, consistent with
Carey et al. (1993) and Scherr and Hulburt (2001), I find that larger firms have shorter
debt durations than their smaller counterparts. Thus, these findings contradict Myers’
(1977) hypothesis that small firms have short-term debt to mitigate agency problems.
Inconsistent with Smith (1996) and Barclay and Smith (1995), I find that regulated firms
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have shorter debt duration, with one exception: non-financial institutions. Once the
sample is restricted to non-financial firms, the results indicate that regulated firms tend to
issue debt with longer duration than non-regulated firms. Finally, strong evidence is
found to support the hypothesis that syndicated public debt offerings, like syndicated
bank loans, have longer duration than their non-syndicated counterparts.
In this essay (Chapter 4), I investigate whether any systematic characteristics lead
firms to determine duration choices. Although this essay supports some work and raises
questions with respect to other work, questions remain concerning the duration choice of
debt issued by U.S. corporations. For example, why is duration a better measurement of a
firm’s interest-rate risk than maturity? Additional research on comparing both approaches
may also contribute to understanding of the results presented here.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation is a collection of three research essays examining (1) bank
lending and interest-rate derivatives [Chapter 2], (2) use of interest-rate derivatives and
bank holding company interest-rate risk [Chapter 3], and (3) duration of corporate debt
issues [Chapter 4].
The first essay of this dissertation (Chapter 2) documents a positive relationship
between derivative usage by U.S. banks and growth in their commercial and industrial
loan portfolios. More specifically, it is found that the aggregate use of derivative
instruments, in particular interest-rate options, interest-rate forwards, and interest-rate
futures, is associated with higher growth rates in C&I loans. These findings are consistent
with the results of earlier studies by Brewer, Minton, and Moser (2000) who examine the
relationship between lending and derivative usage for a sample of FDIC-insured
commercial banks between 1985 and 1992. This documented positive association is
consistent with Diamond’s (1984) hypothesis that derivative contracting and lending are
complementary activities. Diamond’s model predicts that banks can reduce the cost of
delegated monitoring by holding a diversified portfolio. Engaging in derivative activities
helps banks reduce the cost of monitoring contracts issued to their loan customers,
thereby enabling banks to increase their lending activities without increasing the total risk
level faced by the banks.
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The major finding of the second essay (Chapter 3) is that stock returns of a bank
holding company using derivatives are less sensitive to interest-rate changes, controlling
for balance sheet composition and asset size. This finding is consistent with the results of
an earlier study by Schrand (1997) who studies a sample of publicly traded savings and
loan associations (S&Ls) from 1984 to 1988. In addition, the findings in this essay are
statistically and economically significant. In fact, the sample results suggest that a bank
holding company, on average, would have to use $209.37 million of capital each year to
shift the interest-rate beta down by 35 basis points if it did not use interest-rate
derivatives to hedge against interest-rate risk. This result is consistent with Diamond’s
(1984) prediction that a bank can successfully use interest-rate derivatives to hedge
against interest-rate risk. Furthermore, the sample results in this essay (Chapter 3) also
suggest that restrictive policies for banks’ derivative activities may have negative
consequences in innovation promotion and more effective bank risk management. The
possibility that the use of interest-rate derivative instruments is associated with lower
bank holding companies’ stock return interest-rate sensitivity implies that restrictions on
bank participation in financial derivatives could prevent banks from managing interestrate risk more effectively.
Much theoretical and empirical research focuses on the determinants of debt
maturity. In the third essay (Chapter 4), departure is made from earlier studies by
examining the duration of debt issues. A sample of 8,627 debt issues from the Thomson
Financial SDC Platinum database is examined to identify the important factors in
determining the length of duration of public, non-convertible debt. Macaulay’s Duration
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is used as the dependent variable to test the theoretical hypotheses that bond duration is
influenced by signaling and asymmetric information as well as agency problems.
The major finding of the third essay (Chapter 4) in this dissertation is that firm
quality, as measured by credit rating, is directly related to bond duration. Evidence
suggesting that bond duration is inversely related to firm size is also found. In addition,
this essay also finds that regulated non-financial firms have longer bond durations and
that syndicated offerings have longer durations than non-syndicated offerings.
Although the third essay (Chapter 4) supports some work and raises questions
with respect to other work, questions still remain regarding the duration choice of debt
issued by U.S. corporations. For example, why is duration a better measurement of a
firm’s interest-rate risk than maturity? Additional research comparing both measures may
contribute to further understanding of the results presented here.
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APPENDIX A

FIRST-STAGE ESTIMATION OF THE PROBABILITY OF
DERIVATIVE USAGE
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F irst-stage E stim ation o f P robability o f D erivative U sag e a,b
Variable
IN TERC EPT

M ean Estim ates
-5.4338

Standard E rror
0.30143

-6.6702

3.7844

CA RATIO

1.4606

0.2315

LN TO TA SST

0.2958

0.0446

LA G D EPEN D EN T

3.4807

0.1187

O B SER V A TIO N S

232096

232096

PSEU D O R -S Q U A R E

0.2227

OPPRF

aThe probit specification is estim ated for each quarter for 36 quarters from 1996 Q1 through 2004 Q4. The
m ean estim ates and the standard error are the m ean and the standard error o f 36 coefficient estim ates.
b The dependent variable for the first-stage regression is th e probability o f derivative usage. O PPRF is the
sam ple banks’ net interest m argin. C A R A T IO is the sam ple b an k s’ capital-to-asset ratio. L N TO T A SST is
the logarithm o f the sam ple b an k s’ total assets, and L A G D E P E N D E N T is the first lag o f the dependent
variable.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

APPENDIX B

COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES ON THE TIME-INDICATOR
VARIABLE FOR EACH REGRESSION OVER THE
PERIOD FROM MARCH 1996 THROUGH
DECEMBER 2004
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C oefficient Estim ates on the T im e-indicator V ariable for E ach R egression
over the Period from M arch 1996 through D ecem ber 2004.
Independent Variables
Intercept
D2 (1996Q3)
D3 (1996Q4)
D4 (1997Q1)
D5 (1997Q2)
D6 (1997Q3)
D7 (1997Q4)
D8 (1998Q1)
D9 (1998Q2)
DIO (1998Q3)
D l l (1998Q4)
D12 (1999Q1)
D13 (1999Q2)
D14 (1999Q3)
D15 (1999Q4)
D16 (2000Q1)
D17 (2000Q2)
D18 (2000Q3)
D19 (2000Q4)
D20 (2001Q1)
D21 (2001Q2)
D22 (2001Q3)
D23 (2001Q4)
D24 (2002Q1)
D25 (2002Q2)
D26 (2002Q3)
D27 (2002Q4)
D28 (2003Q1)
D29 (2003Q2)
D30 (2003Q3)
D31 (2003Q4)
D32 (2004Q1)
D33 (2004Q2)
D34 (2004Q3)
D35 (2004Q4)

Regression (1)
-0.00521
(-3.95)***
-0.0075
(-5.67) ***
-0,0048
(-3.60) ***
-0.0059
(-4.47) ***
-0,0054
(-4.05) ***
-0.0079
(-5.90) ***
-0.0063
(-4.64) ***
-0.0004
(-0.27)
-0.0064
(-4.72) ***
-0,0084
(-6.18)“ *
-0.0084
(-6.18) ***
-0.0063
(-4.58) ***
-0.0062
(-4.55) **’
-0.0051
(-1.50)
-0.0067
(-1.94)*
-0.0039
(-1.14)
-0.0014
(-0.41)
-0.0049
(-3.61) ***
-0.0067
(-4.81)***
-0.0017
(-1.25)
-0,0063
(-4.52)***
-0.0062
(-4.84) ***
-0.0091
(-7.14) ***
-0.0077
(-5.95) *“
-0.0069
(-5.35) ***
-0.0072
(-5.59) ***
-0.0093
(-7.18) ***
-0.0079
(-6.07) ***
-0.0074
(-5.66) ***
-0.0085
(-6.53) ***
-0.010
(-7.74) ***
-0.0076
(-5.78) ***
-0.0074
(-5.60) ***
-0,0074
(-5.64) ***
-0.0086
(-6.58) ***

Regression (2)
-0.0054
(-1.72) *
-0.0023
(-2.73) ***
0.0004
(0.27)
-0.0007
(-0.87)
-0.0002
(-0.24)
-0.0027
(-2.84) ***
-0.001
(-1.24)
0.0048
(0.80)
-0.0012
(-1.43)
-0.0032
(-3.62) ***
-0.0011
(-1.26)
-0.001
(-1.13)
-0.0005
(-0.51)
-0.0021
(-1.86)*
0.0007
(0.70)
0.0033
(2,07) **
0.0002
(0.32)
-0.0014
(-1.51)
0.0035
(0.90)
-0.0011
(-1.06)
-0.0009
(-1.05)
-0.0039
(-4.07) ***
-0.0024
(-2.29)
-0.0017
(-1.14)
-0.0019
(-2.16) **
-0.0040
(-4.35) ***
-0.0026
(-2.75) **
-0.0022
(-2.10) **
-0.0032
(-3.57) ***
-0,0048
(-5.27) ***
-0.0023
(-2.47) **
-0.0022
(-2.14) **
-0.0022
(-2.31)**
-0.0034
(-3.83) ***
-0.0024
(-2.53) **

Regression (3)
-0.0054
(-1.73) *
-0.0023
(-2.74) ***
0.0004
(0.28)
-0.0007
(-0.87)
-0.0002
(-0.24)
-0.0027
(-2.84) ***
-0.0011
(-1.26)
0.0048
(0.80)
-0.0012
(-1.43)
-0.0032
(-3.63) ***
-0.0011
(-1.27)
-0.001
(-1.13)
-0.0006
(-0.55)
-0.0021
(-1.86) *
0,0007
(0.62)
0.0032
(2.03) **
0,0003
(0.33)
-0.0014
(-1-51)
0.0035
(0.90)
-0.0011
(-1.04)
-0.0009
(-1.05)
-0.0038
(-4.07) ***
-0.0024
(-2.29) **
-0.0017
(-1.13)
-0.0019
(-2.15) **
-0.0040
(-4.34) ***
-0.0026
(-2.73) **-0.0022
(-2.07) **
-0.0032
(-3.55) ***
-0.0048
(-5.24) ***
-0.0023
(-2.44) ***
-0.0021
(-2.11) **«
-0.0022
(-2.28) ***
-0.0034
(-3.79) ***
-0.0024
(-2.49) **
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Regression (4)
-0.0055
(-1.49)
0.0027
(1.91) **
0.0016
(3.85) ***
0.0022
(4.60) ***
-0.0002
(-0.38)
0.0014
(2.99) ***
0.0071
(1.18)
0.0013
(3.15) ***
-0.0006
(-1.37)
0.0012
(2.30) **
0.0013
(3.04) ***
0.0020
(2.47) **
0.0004
(0.49)
0.0028
(4.25) ***
0,0057
(4.12) ***
0.0026
(6.15) ***
0.0004
(0.98)
0.0059
(1.54)
0.0010
(1.50)
0.0016
(2.54) **
-0.0012
(-2.07) **
-0.0001
(-0.15)
0,0006
(0.49)
0.0007
(1.28)
-0.0014
(-2.37) **
-0.0002
(-0.04)
0.0003
(0.54)
-0.0007
(-1.35)
-0.0022
(-3.78) ***
0.0001
(0.19)
0.0004
(0.55)
0.0002
(0.35)
-0.0008
(-1.48)
0.0001
(0.23)
(0.079)
(2.16) **
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